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Abstract
DO INSTITUTIONS MATTER FOR REGIONAL ECONOMIC GROWTH AND 
DEVELOPMENT? THE CASE OF TURKEY
Many cross-country studies acknowledge the indispensable role of institutions in promoting 
economic growth and in sustaining economic development. So, their emphases have shifted to 
determine the most influential institution(s) in order to be specific. While these papers are 
widespread in the recent literature, the role of institutions within-country level has not been 
yet  discussed  in  detail.  Although the  formal  institutional  structures  of  many nation-state 
countries apply to their all regions, results may differ depending upon various conditions. 
Considering these differentiated outcomes, this study aims to discuss the roles and functions 
of institutions in regional economic growth and development. To that end, first objective of 
this paper  is to  provide  an  introductory  background  by surveying  and   s ystematically 
documenting the evidences on the impact of institutions on regional growth and development 
outcomes  from  both  the  theoretical  and  empirical  studies  within a voluminous  literature. 
Second objective is to elaborate this survey by classifying these studies with respect to their 
different conceptions about “institutions” and to their methodological approaches adopted. By 
doing that, this paper try to propose an analytical framework that identifies the channels of 
influence between institutions and economic performance outcomes. As the main concern of
that  study,  third  objective  is  to  discuss  whether  institutions  really  matter  for  regional 
economic growth and development and, if so, how can institutions be included in the regional 
growth  and  development  policies.  Turkey  is a  convenient  example  for  this discussion. 
Although its fundamental written institutions have a countrywide validity, their density and 
quality varies among regions. So, lastly, it is planned to be done an empirical exercise to 
reveal  the  linkages  between  prominent  characteristics  of  these  regional  institutions  and 
economic performances of regions for the case of Turkey. To sum up, the novelty of this 
paper is to provide an extensive but a systematic survey of many studies in related literature 
and to contribute in part to the empirics of the relationship between institutions and  regional 
economic growth and development. Finally, it is expected to obtain a sound understanding 
about the institutional approach both in economic growth and economic development spheres 
within the regional context.    
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1. Introduction
   
Since the belief that institutions determine the incentives of and the constraints on 
actors of a society, and shape the economic, political and social outcomes has strengthened in 
the beginnings of 1990s, the study of the nature and role of institutions has become a central 
concern  of  economists  and  other  social  scientists.
1 The  arguments about  the  role  of 
institutions in promoting growth and development both in developed or developing countries
2
and as one  of  the  fundamental determinant of  economic  performance differences across 
countries (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008) have been started to be frequently discussed not 
only by  the  proponents  of  (new) institutional  economics
3 but  also by  the  followers of
mainstreamneoclassical economics. “Although this view has a long history (Smith, 1776)
4, it 
has experienced a recent major revival in the economics literature” (Owen and Weatherston, 
2007,  p.142).
5 In  parallel  with  these  arguments,  reforming  the institutions (“getting 
institutions right”)
6 has been a popular and dominant policy-making paradigm suggested in 
the  receipts of  policy  advisers worldwide to solve the  problems of countries  with  poor
economic growth and development performances. But some questions in-depth about which 
institutions matter and how these institutions can be improved in order to promote further 
economic growth and development are still not completely and concretely answered in the 
literature. For the present, there are just some suggestions about what should not be done 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008).
While underlying the significance of institutions in terms of economic outcomes, the 
fact that the economic institutions are not independently of a political process should not be 
overlooked. At the end, the  political process  is the outcome of social decisions  taken by 
different groups and individuals benefiting from different economic institutions. So there are
                                                  
1 Garside  (2007:1)  argues  that  in  part  this belief reflects  a  preoccupation  to  establish  the  fu ndamental 
determinants of capital accumulation and innovation, and thereby long-term growth and development.
2 See World Bank (1993, 1997), Stiglitz (1999).
3 A full discussion of the literature surrounding new institutional economics exceeds the boundaries of this paper. 
For informative studies, see North (1995b), Vromen (1995), Clauge (1997), Williamson (2000), Touffut (2003) 
and Hodgson (2003).
4 Adam Smith  (1776) noted that private  contracting  (institutional quality) is an important prerequisite  for the 
mutually beneficial exchanges that promote specialization, innovation and growth—the main factors leading to 
gains from trade (De, 2010).
5 The role of the challenging theoretical work by Douglass C. North (1990) is worth to emphasize in revealing
this view and in sparking renewed interest on the roles and functions of  institutions. This study of North (1990) 
puts institutions at the centre of a discussion on the historical development of modern capitalism.  2
conflicts over these decisions and it is unsurprisingly they are concluded in favor of groups 
with  have  greater  political  power. This i s why  it  is not  an easy target to  reform  these 
institutions alone. Since the nature of political institutions and the distributions of resources 
determine the political power, in turn, it affects the performance of economic institutions. In 
sum, “both political and economic institutions are essential parts of an effective institutional 
matrix” (North, 1991, p.98). Frances sums this conjugate relationship between economic and 
political institutions in two sentences:
The role of political institutions in the creation of economic institutions means that 
economic institutions will  not always be designed in ways that aim to maximize 
economic growth. However, the distribution of political power can change over 
time as the political and economic environment change and create an appetite for 
efficiency-enhancing change in economic institutions (2004: 8).
So, this two-way interaction still makes it so problematic to reach an equilibrium point
where the  interests  of political  institutions  and  good  economic  institutions  intersect. 
Moreover, “the casual links between political and economic institutions and economic growth 
are  still  not  entirely  clear” (Garside,  2007,  p.3).
7 However, this relationship should  be 
revealed for those who would wish to solve the problem of lagging countries by designing
better policies, but, given these challenges between economic and political institutions,  this 
study is centrally built around attempts to answer the question that how do institutions affect 
the performances of economic systems from the perspective of institutions hypothesis.
“Institutions are established and accepted ways of getting things done in society, and 
include  sets  of  norms,  rules  and procedures  that  define  social  practice  and  influence 
interactions” (Garside,  2007,  p.2). Among  the  various  institutions  fit to  that general
definition, the 'institutionalist' school in economics frequently emphasizes the importance of 
property rights, legal systems and the rule of law, land tenure, political stability, and other 
formal and informal social institutions (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, 2002; Hall and Jones, 
1999;  Acemoglu  et  al.,  2001a,  2005a;  Djankov  et  al.,  2003). While  emphasizing  these 
institutions, institutionalists consider the most basic function (the major role) of institutions in 
                                                                                                                                                              
6 This  phrase  suggests  an  active  voice  in  which,  once  correctly  identified,  the  “right”  institutions  can  be 
transplanted to replace the “wrong” institutions that currently are in place (Williamson, 2009, p.371)
7 While the political power structure can affect economic growth by shaping a country's economic institutions, 
these in turn  shape political power through their effect upon the distribution of resources  (Acemoglu et  al., 
2005a).3
a society as to reduce uncertainty by providing astable (but not necessarily efficient)structure 
to everyday life, and so they all accept institutions as a guide to human interaction.
8 The 
reflection of these institutional effects on the performance of the economies shows itself by 
the costs of exchange (trade) and production. In other words, “together with the technology 
employed, they determine the transaction and transformation (production) costs that make up 
total  costs” (North,  1990,  p.3 and p.6),  this  is  the  way of institutions enter  into  the  cost 
functions in an economy. Herein the role for institutions, “in transaction cost terms, is to
reduce transaction and production costs per exchange so that the potential gains from trade 
are  realizable”  (North,  1991,  p.98).
9 However,  the  neoclassical  theory has defined  a 
frictionless environment and neglected these costs and thus role of institutions.
10 According to 
that framework, the formal economic constraints or property rights are specified and enforced 
by political institutions, and the neoclassical literature simply takes those as a given (North, 
1991, p.98).
11 Because it was previously felt that such institutions developed as a result of 
economic development, but the institutions hypothesis argues the converse situation which
institutions are a causal determinant of growth and development.
12 Formally, the idea lies 
beneath this argument is that institutions which affect the context within which firms operate, 
such as the constitution and the rule of law which protect private property rights and prevent 
corruption,  can  be  regarded  as  'market  creating'  since  they  secure  potential  returns  on 
investmentand affect the scope for rent-seeking (Rodrik, 2003). So, after a while, neoclassical 
economic growth theory has come to apoint that accept the institutions matter and admits the 
explanations of economic progress could not just only depend on inputs in the production 
process regarding the institutions are given. That means the integration of institutions to the 
neoclassical economic growth theory has gained paceover time.
                                                  
8 In a nutshell, institutions define and limit the set of choices of individuals (North, 1990, p.4).
9 For  instance,  firms  face  transaction  costs  when  they  are  uncertain  whether  they  will  receive  an  expected 
outcome  from an exchange. Institutions matter in this  context because the rules surrounding the protection of 
assets held by a firm (including protection from expropriation by the state) and contract enforcement reduce such 
costs by  encouraging investment in human  and  physical  capital  and by increasing the likelihood  of  e xpected 
outcomes (Coase, 1960; North, 1994; Aron, 2000 as cited in Garside, 2007, p.3).
10 The  theory  is  based  on the  fu ndamental  assumption  of  scarcity  and  hence  competition;  its  harmonious 
implications  come  from  its  assumptions  about  a  frictionless  exchange  process  in  which  property  rights  are 
perfectly  and  costlessly  specified  and  information  is  likewise  costless  to  acquire.  Although  the  scarcity  and 
hence competition assumption has been robust and has provided the key underpinnings of neoclassical theory, 
the other assumptions have not survived nearly so well (North, 1990, p.11).
11 However, there are many examples in the economic history that failed to produce a set of economic rules of 
the game (with enforcement) that induce sustained economic growth (North, 1991, p.98).
12 But although it is  readily accepted that  well-performing institutions  are  associated with economic  growth, 
there is keen debate over whether they are  always or necessarily the prime movers  (see Easterly and Levine, 
2003; Acemoglu et al., 2001a; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2003; Sachs, 2003b; Frances, 2004).4
In  the  last  two-three decades,  much of the theoretical  and  empirical research  on 
economic growth has followed a “production function” approach to explain variations in rates 
of economic growth and levels of development across different countries and across time. 
Following Solow (1956), this approach associates a country’s aggregate output to the level of 
its inputs into the productive process. These well-known factors of production are simply
physical capital (machinery, factories, and infrastructure), labor (the number of workers or 
hours worked), human capital (demonstrating the quality of human inputs into production due 
to level of education, on-the-job-training and health status), and technology (the knowledge 
about how to produce output). According to this point of view, growth of output take place 
due to the growth of inputs into the production process (particularly technological change and 
the  accumulation  of  physical  and  human  capital).  However,  these  explanations  and
decompositions do not allow us to reach to the real underlying sources of growth.
13 It just tell 
us that the country A is richer than the country B, because the country A has a higher rate of 
physical capital investment and a more highly educated labor force (human capital), and uses 
these inputs more efficiently (technology).
14 But it does not answer to the questions that why 
has the country A saved and invested more than the country B and so accumulated higher 
levels  of  physical  and  human  capital,  or  why  does  the  country  A  use  its  inputs  more 
efficiently than country B. Institutionalist simply answer these questions: “this is because the 
factors of production  mentioned are not  causes of  growth, they  are growth” (North  and 
Thomas, 1973, p.2). In contemporary terminology, they are the proximate determinants of 
aggregate output, not fundamental causes (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008; Pamuk, 2010).
To examine the “fundamental” or “deeper” determinants of economic growth and 
development, more and more explanatory variables have been incorporated into the models 
until the end of the 20
th century. This search for deep determinants of investment, technology 
and efficiency, shortly of growth, has especially concentrated on relatively slowly changing, 
durable characteristics that have a pervasive effect on a country’s economy over extended 
                                                  
13 Moreover, some authors, such as Garside (2007), argue that the time has long passed when explanations of 
economic progress could focus only on inputs into the production process and the aggregate production approach 
which stressed the need to raise the ratio of investment to income as the means of quickening the pace of self-
sustained growth has been found wanting.
14 There are also some cases that this relationship is not seen in an expected way. As stated by Clauge (1997), 
although both physical  and human  capital accumulation  are important, there is ample  evidence of  countries 5
periods  of  time.  “These include a country’s geography, the quality of  its institutions, the 
extent to which it is integrated into the international trading system (economic policies), and 
a society’s culture, reflected in its attitudes, beliefs and values” (Owen and Weatherston, 
2007,  p.139).
15 There  is  a debate about the  relative  importance of each  in terms of their 
contribution  to  economic  growth,  but  there  is general  agreement  that  well  performing 
institutions are associated with economic growth (Frances, 2004, p.2).
16 Nevertheless, it is 
noteworthy to stress here that the literature comparing the relative importance of institutions 
and geography is considerably large.
After  the belief that “institutions  are the underlying determinant of  the  long-run 
performance of economies” (North, 1990, p.107), was printed into some economists’ minds, 
then,  the  institutional  factors  have  been frequently included, complementing  the  more 
traditional variables, into the both neoclassical and endogenous models of both theoretical and 
empirical studies. Then, the empirical evidence have started to suggest that especially the 
quality  of  institutions,  through  their  influence  upon  the  levels  of  investment  and  the 
regulatory, economic and financial environment in which firms operate, affects the level and 
growth of GDP per capita and the volatility of growth (Acemoglu et al., 2001a; Hall and 
Jones, 1999; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Frances, 2004; Rodrik et al., 2002). Although the 
evidence  suggests  that  the  quality  of  institutions  has  a  robust  and  significant  indirect 
relationship to growth via its effect on the volume of investment,
17 there are still some serious 
problems with data and methodology in the empirical studies exploring the relation between 
institutions and growth/development, especially in the cross-country econometric studies in 
addition to the absence of data for the within country studies (for details, see Section 3). 
Nevertheless, these studies are important as Aron acknowledged that:
                                                                                                                                                              
enjoying only modest economic growth despite having high rates of physical capital accumulation, and of others 
gaining little or no growth even when education has expanded rapidly.
15 Institutions  are  seen  as  a  deep  determinant  because  they  mainly  change  relatively  slowly  over  time 
(Williamson, 2000)  and  because they  affect the incentives to accumulate physical  and human  capital,  and to 
innovate and adopt new technology, thus having  an important  effect on the proximate determinants of output
(Owen and Weatherston, 2007, p.143).
16 For  instance,  Easterly  and  Levine  (2003)  suggest  that  geography/endowments  have  played  a  determining 
factor  in  influencing  the  quality  of  land,  labor  and  production  technologies,  and  explain  cross-country 
differences in economic development through their impact upon institutions.
17 In particular, better quality institutions reduce red tape and rent-seeking activities and (more weakly) improve 
the efficiency of investment by enforcing well-def ined property rights (Aron, 2000).6
Evidences from global cross-country econometric studies are potentially important 
because the paucity and weakness of both macroeconomic and institutional data 
for many developing countries preclude robust policy interpretations on a country-
by-country basis (2000, p.99).
      
Considering the importance of institutions for the economic growth and development 
literature and underlying all these significant contributions of the institutional approach to
economics,  this study generally aims to discuss the roles  and  functions of  institutions  in 
economic growth and development. To that end, first objective of this paper is to provide a
background by surveying and systematically documenting the evidences on the impact of 
institutions on growth and development outcomes from both the theoretical and empirical 
studies  within  a voluminous  literature.  Second  objective  is t o elaborate  this  survey  by 
classifying these studies with respect to their different conceptions about “institutions” and to 
their methodological approaches adopted. By doing that, this paper proposes an analytical 
framework that first analyzes how the concept of “institution” is defined and used in the 
literature, and second identifies various institutions classified in some studies. Then it briefly 
evaluate some quantitative and qualitative methods and the corresponding research techniques 
to link some measures of institutions with the known indicators of economic growth and 
development.  As the  main  concern of  that study, third objective is t o discuss  whether 
institutions  really  matter  for  regional economic growth and  development and,  if  so, how 
institutions can be included in the regional growth and development policies. And lastly, it is 
planned  to  be  done  an  empirical  exercise  to  reveal  the  linkages  between  prominent 
characteristics of these regional institutions and economic performances of regions for the 
case of Turkey.
In order to try to achieve all these aims, the remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 focuses on the studies in the literature which present us the theoretical 
background and the empirical works. Then, Section 3 gathers the definitions of institutions
from different sources and summarizes the methodologies used in the literature. In the fourth 
section,  the  linkages  between  the  institutional  structures  and  regional  disparities  are 
documented and discussed. Section 5 is devoted to make an empirical exercise in order to 
capture the linkages mentioned in the fourth section for the case of Turkey. Section 6 contains 
concluding comments and suggestions for further researches.7
2. Literature Survey
  
This section aims to provide a survey of studies from both theoretical and empirical 
literature that  explore the  relationship  between  institutions  and growth/development. First 
subsection tries to provide a theoretical background getting assistance from studies attempt to 
describe  the theoretical  approaches  of  institutionalists  within the  framework  of economic 
analysis. Second  subsection  covers  some  empirical  studies  heavily interested with  the 
relationship between  institutions  and  cross-country growth differences as  well  as  within-
country studies considering regional economic performance disparities.
2.1 Theoretical Background
Among  the  various  schools  of  economic  thought,  the  institutionalist  school  of 
economic thought has been diverse and varied. Nevertheless, it can generally be divided into 
two major traditions as the  “old”  and  the  “new”  institutional  economics.  The  “old” 
institutional economy (henceforth OIE) is the American institutional tradition that evolved at 
the turn of the century,
18 associated with Veblen, Mitchell, Commons, and Ayres (Rutherford,
1994; Hodgson, 1998). It is often referred to as “the Veblerian tradition”, although “it does 
not represent a single well-defined or unified body of thought, methodology, or program of 
research.” (Rutherford, 1994, p.1). It has in fact included two different traditions; one with 
origin  in  Veblen’s  work  and  the  other  developed  from  Commons. Although  there  were 
important differences in their views, they shared a common antipathy towards neo-classical 
approaches and conventional economic models, which were criticized for their unrealistic 
assumptions  and  inattention  to  historical  change  (Sunley, 1996; Scott, 1995).  The  OIE 
“stressed that economic processes operate within a social framework that was in turn shaped 
by a set of cultural and historical forces” (Scott, 1995, p.2).
The “new” institutional economics (henceforth NIE) has evolved more recently. It 
can be seen as a revival and expansion of the institutionalist elements that for a long period 
had been neglected in classical and neo-classical economies (Rutherford, 1994). As with the 
OIE, it includes varied and disparate strands, including works of Williamson and North as 
some of the most known.8
The NIE is critical of the OIE; defining it as “descriptivist and anti-formalist, holist, 
behaviorist,  and  collectivist” (Rutherford, 1994,  p.4).  As noted  by  Hodgson,  however, 
“characterizations of the ‘old’ institutionalism as purely descriptive or anti-theoretical do not 
bear up to close scrutiny….. The early institutionalists addressed crucial theoretical issues.”
Particularly in the writings of Veblen
19 and Commons,
20 there is a strong emphasis on the 
importance and priority of the tasks of theoretical explanation and theoretical development 
(Hodgson, 1998, p.166).
The neo-Veblerians (OIE) on their hand makes the opposite criticisms of the NIE, 
portraying it as “formalist, individualist, reductionist, orientated toward rational choice and 
economizing models” (Rutherford, 1994, p.4). If it necessary to compare these two alternate 
traditions, while the NIE is following the “mainstream” economics, accepting the individual 
rational choice model
21 (Harrington and Ferguson, 1999; Rutherford, 1994), the OIE offers a 
broader view of institutions, more in accordance with institutional approaches advanced in 
sociology and anthropology. It places institutions at the centre of economic behavior, and 
does not only add “culture” and “society”.
Also from the broader  realm  of social scientists, NIE  has been dismissed on the 
grounds that it is based on neo-classical premises, and on the grounds that it applies a narrow 
conception of institutions. Institutions are mainly seen as political and economic regulations, 
functioning as constraints of the individual choice and activity. Institutions have the main 
function of creating predictable conditions by reducing uncertainty (Karlsen, 1999).
In  the modern development  literature  two  recent  strands  of  (new)  institutional 
economics have been influential. One is associated with the theory of imperfect information: 
                                                                                                                                                              
18 This earlier institutionalism had actually been dominant in economics departments in American universities 
just after the First World War (Hodgson, 1998, p.166).
19 For example, Veblen (1899, 1919) was the first social scientist to attempt to develop a theory of economic and 
institutional evolution along essentially Darwinian lines (Hodgson 1993).
20 In  addition,  Commons  (1924,  1934)  has  been  acknowledged  as  a  major  influence  on,  fo r  example,  the 
behavioral  economics  of  H erbert  Simon  (1979)  and  even  the  “new”  institutionalism  of  Oliver  Williamson 
(1975).
21 This is because as  explained in North  (1990:5), defining institutions  as the  constraints that human beings 
impose  on  themselves  makes  the  def inition  complementary  to  the  choice  theoretic  approach  of  ne oclassical 
economic theory.9
the underlying rationale of institutional arrangements and contracts (formal or informal) are 
explained in terms of strategic behavior under asymmetric information among the different 
parties involved. This theory has been fruitfully used in modeling many key agrarian and 
other institutions in poor countries, which are seen to emerge as substitutes for missing credit, 
insurance and futures markets in an environment of pervasive risks, information asymmetry, 
and  moral  hazard.  It started  with the  literature on sharecropping,  then on interlocking of 
transactions in labor, credit, marketing, and land lease, on labor tying, on credit rationing, on 
joint  liability  in group lending schemes, and so on. For examples  and overviews of the 
models, see the edited volumes by Bardhan (1989), by Nabli and Nugent (1989), and by Hoff, 
Braverman, and Stiglitz (1993).
The other school, associated primarily with North (1981, 1990) and Greif (1992, 
1997), concentrates on comparative historical analysis of development processes (mainly in 
Western Europe and North America).
22 Generally, North has pointed to the inevitable tradeoff 
in the historical growth process between economies of scale and specialization on the one 
hand, and transaction costs on the other. In a small, closed, face-to-face peasant community, 
for  example,  transaction  costs  are  low,  but  the  production  costs  are  high,  because 
specialization and division of labor are severely limited by the extent of market defined by the 
personalized exchange process of the small community. In a large-scale complex economy, as 
the network of interdependence widens the impersonal exchange process gives considerable 
scope for all kinds of opportunistic behavior and the costs of transacting can be high (Bardhan 
and Udry, 1999, p.217). Greif (1994) ex amined the self-enforcing institutions of collective 
punishment  for  malfeasance  in  long-distance trade in  the  late  medieval  period  and  in  a 
comparative  study  of  the  Maghribi  and  the  Genoese  traders  explored  the  institutional 
foundations of commercial development.
Both of these strands of institutional economics have provided major insights in the 
micro-foundations of institutional arrangements in developing countries and in understanding 
of underdevelopment as an institutional failure. Both underline the multiplicity of equilibrium, 
given the strategic interactions that result in the institutions as equilibrium outcomes, allowing 
                                                  
22 This is why North and Greif believe that institutions evolve incrementally, connecting the past with present 
and  the  future;  history  in  consequence  is  largely  a story of  i nstitutional  evolution  in  which  the  historical 
performance of economies can only be understood as a part of a sequential story (North, 1991, p.97).10
for  historical  initial  conditions  and  cultural  beliefs  (that  coordinate  agents’  expectations) 
influencing the selection of a particular equilibrium. At the same time it is clear that the 
literature has barely scratched  the surface of an as yet  largely  unexplored story in p oor 
countries.  Particularly  lacking  are  theoretically-informed  inductive  historical  analyses  of 
institutional change (or atrophy) in these countries, of the kind that Greif has so incisively 
carried out for late medieval Europe.
2.2 Empirical Studies
A  recent  wave  of  influential  empirical  studies  in  the  economics  literature  has 
attempted to identify the “fundamental” factors that underpin long-term economic growth and 
development and that account for such large differences in average living standards across 
countries. The key contenders are a country's geographical characteristics, the quality of its 
institutions, the  extent  of  its  integration  with  world  markets,  and  differences  in  culture. 
Existing empirical studies have attempted to evaluate how much of the overall variation in per 
capita real income levels across countries can be explained by representative proxies for some 
or all of these factors and, because each has different implications for policy, to assess their 
relative importance (Owen and Weatherston, 2007, p.137).
In the empirical literature, the terms politics and institutions encompass a wide range 
of  indicators,  including  institutional  quality  (the enforcement of property  rights),  political 
instability  (riots,  coups,  civil  wars),  characteristics  of  political  regimes  (elections, 
constitutions, executive powers), social capital (the extent of civic activity and organizations), 
and  social  characteristics  (differences  in  income  and  in  ethnic,  religious,  and  historical 
background).
The  aim  of  this subsection  is to provide  an accessible critical  overview  of this 
literature, emphasizing the basic arguments that lie behind the econometric exercises and the 
various attempts to make statements about the relative strength of casual relationships. To that 
end, this subsection summarizes some of the important recent contributions to the empirical 
institutions  and growth  literature.  Table  1  lists  five  widely cited papers  in  this  literature, 
which are termed  as  'Core  Papers'  by  Pande and Udry  (2005).  These  papers  firstly  use 
influential institutional quality measures or instrumental variables to address the endogeneity 11
of institutional variables. Then in Table 2, again following the terminology of Pande and Udry 
(2005), 'Papers Citing Core Papers' are described. These articles are the ones which at least 
cite one of the core papers and published in major journals. Herein this limited literature
survey include papers with at least one cross-country regression which consider a measure of 
the country's growth performance as the outcome variable of interest and consist a measure of 
institutional quality as an explanatory variable.
As it was cited in the introduction, following Srinivasan (1995) and Lal and Myint 
(1996), Aron (2000) states that evidence from global cross-country econometric studies is 
potentially  important  because  the  paucity  and  weakness  of  both  macroeconomic  and 
institutional data for many developing countries preclude robust policy interpretations on a 
country-by-country basis. Moreover, by showing Africa as an instance, Aron (2000) argues 
that several  cross-country studies  of growth  have  found  that  the  conventional  factors of 
growth  (labor,  physical and human capital  accumulation,  and so on) do not fully  explain 
Africa’s experience and have turned to an institutional explanation. Therefore, following the 
Aron (2000), this subsection of the paper try to examine a range of influential studies in the 
heterogeneous  literature on growth, development and  institutions, both  to obtain a better 
understanding  of  the  linkages  involved  and  to  assess  critically  the  strong  claims  made
sometimes by the authors. 
   
Mauro (1995) analyzes a data set consisting of subjective indices of corruption, the 
amount of red tape, the efficiency of the judicial system, and various categories of political 
stability for a cross-section of countries. The finding of Mauro (1995) is that the corruption 
lower  investment,  thereby  lower  economic  growth.  By u sing an index  of  ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization as an instrument, author argues that his results warranted to be robust to 
controlling for endogeneity.
Knack  and  Keefer  (1995)  aim to quantify  the  relationship  between  institutions, 
investment  and  growth using  indicators provided  by  country  risk  evaluators  to potential 
foreign investors. These measures used by Knack and Keefer (1995), include evaluations of 
contract enforceability, the rule of law, and risk of expropriation. Using these measures, they 
found that institutions that protect property rights are crucial to investment and to economic 
growth, and when institutions are controlled for, stronger evidence emerges for conditional 12
convergence (that means rates of convergence to U.S. level incomes increase notably when 
these property rights variables are included in growth regressions). Additionally, they have 
also argues that these results are robust to the inclusion of measures of factor accumulation 
and of economic policy.
  
La  Porta et al. (1999)  investigate  empirically  the  determinants of  the quality of 
governments in a large cross-section of countries. They assess government performance using 
measures of government intervention, public sector efficiency, public good provision, size of 
government, and political freedom. They find that countries that are poor, close to the equator, 
ethnolinguistically heterogeneous, use French or socialist laws, or have high proportions of 
Catholics or Muslims exhibit inferior government performance. They also find that the larger 
governments tend to be  the better performing ones. Finally, they argue that the importance of 
reasonably  exogenous  historical  factors  in  explaining  the  variation  in  government 
performance across countries sheds light on the economic, political, and cultural theories of 
institutions.
Hall and Jones (1999) look for the sources of the variation in output per worker in 
their frequently cited paper. On an accounting basis, their analysis show that differences in 
physical capital and educational attainment can only partially explain the variation in output 
per worker, in other words, they find a large amount of variation in the level of the Solow 
residual across countries. At a deeper level, they document that the differences in capital 
accumulation,  productivity, and therefore output per  worker  are driven by differences  in 
institutions and government policies, which we call social infrastructure. They treat social 
infrastructure as endogenous, determined historically by location and other factors captured in 
part by language.
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robison (henceforth AJR, 2001a) suggest that the mortality 
rates among  early  European settlers  in a colony (obviously  related  to  its  geography  and 
disease patterns) determined  if  the  Europeans  mainly concentrated on  installing  resource 
extractive or plundering institutions there or decided to settle and build European institutions 
like those protecting property rights. AJR (2001a) use mortality rates of colonial settlers as 
an instrument for institutional quality, thus trying to avoid the problem of endogeneity of 
institutions vis-a-vis income.13
All  these  authors  find  substantial  differences  in  the  measures  of  economic 
institutions, and significant correlation between  these  measures and various  indicators of 
economic  performance.  Nevertheless,  this  type  of  correlation  does not establish that the 
countries  with  worse  institutions  are  poor  because  of  their  institutions.  Consequently, 
evidence  based  on  correlation  does  not  establish  whether  institutions  are  important 
determinants of economic outcomes (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008, p.3).
3. Definitions of Institutions and Methodologies to Measure
This section asks two questions: what is m eant by the term “institutions” and how 
they are measured. In the first subsection of the following section, definitions of institutions 
from  various sources  are given  and these definitions are elaborated presenting diversified 
classifications. In the second part, the measurement problem of institutions are discussed and 
different methodologies to tackle with these problems are given based on the empirical studies 
dealing with the impact of institutions on growth and development.
3.1. Defining Institutions
Douglass  C.  North  introduced  his  seminal  1991  paper,  namely  “Institutions”, 
defining the institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic 
and  social interaction” (North,  1991,  p.97).  Then, he shortly  juxtaposed the  fundamental 
functions of institutions to emphasize their importance in terms of economic performance. By 
doing that, indeed, he extended his definition of institutions in an operational way. According 
to  that,  “institutions  have  been  devised  by  human  beings  to  create  order  and  reduce 
uncertainty in exchange” (North, 1991, p.97). Most importantly, North (1991) argues that 
institutions (define the choice set and) determine transaction and production costs and hence 
the profitability and feasibility of engaging in economic activity. As a result, that means, by 
the own words of author, “institutions provide the incentive structure of an economy; as that 
structure evolves, it shapes the direction of economic change towards growth, stagnation, or 
decline”.14
This  institutional  framework  drawn  by  North  comprises both  formal rules and 
informal  constraints.
23 There  is a c ontinuum  with  unwritten sanctions,  taboos,  customs, 
traditions and  codes  of  conduct  at  one  end  and  constitutions,  laws and  property  rights
governing economics and politics at the other end. In an environment with absence of formal 
rules,  a dense  of  social  network  leads  to  the  development  of  customs,  laws,  trust,  and 
normative rules that constitute an informal institutional framework (e.g., see Bates, 1989).
Surely, these informal constraints are pervasive and crucial in modern economies too.
People  in both rich  and  poor  countries  rely  on  informal  institutions to  facilitate 
transactions, but these  institutions  are  relatively  more  important  in poor countries  where 
formal institutions are less developed. Moreover, poor people in developing countries are 
often  ill-served  by  the  limited  formal  institutions  available.  In  poor  countries,  and  poor 
regions  in particular,  informal  institutions substitute  for formal  institutions.  Countries  and 
communities can go a long way towards resolving information and enforcement problems 
without using their formal public legal systems (World Bank, 2002).
Another crucial  distinction  made  by  North  (1990)  is  between institutions and 
organizations. North (1990: 4) states that like institutions, organizations provide a structure to 
human interaction, but he adds that rules (institutions) must be clearly differentiated from the 
players  (organizations). According  to  the  author, organizations  are groups of individuals 
bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives. For instance, they include political 
bodies (political parties, the Senate, a city council, a regulatory agency), economic bodies 
(firms,  trade unions,  family  farms, cooperatives), social  bodies  (churches,  clubs,  athletic 
associations), and educational bodies (schools, universities, vocational training centers).   
With the increasing specialization and the division of labor, societies became more 
complex, so the rate of return to institutionalization (forming political, judicial, and economic 
rules and contracts) raises due to their facilitator role in political or economic exchanges.
These rules have also an interior hierarchy, generally, from constitutions to state and common 
laws, to specific by-laws, to individual contracts. In that hierarchical ladder, one in the higher
is the more costly to alter.Williamson (2000) offers an alternative to a classification along the 
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formality  of  institutions, based  on different hierarchical  levels  (1,  2,  3,  and 4).  Level  1 
institutions are located at the social embeddedness level. Social norms, customs, traditions, 
etc. are located at this level. These traditional institutions often date back many centuries, are 
generally informal and can be regarded as exogenous to the economic system. This level is of 
utmost importance for people living in developing countries, where the other levels (II–IV) 
have only been partly established and/or do not function properly. Level 2 institutions relate 
to the rules of the game. Their main purpose is to define and enforce property rights. Most of 
them are formal institutions like conventions or laws, but examples also exist of informal 
institutions, e.g. rules governing access to natural resources, that are not written down but are 
quite strongly binding and therefore fit under this umbrella. In contrast to the institutions 
described in Level 1, the time horizon of a potential change is shorter. Institutions that relate 
to governance are classified as Level 3 institutions. These institutions craft order and reshape 
incentives, thereby building the governance structure of a society and leading to the building 
of specific organizations like the local or national government, state agencies, NGOs, etc. The 
time  frame  for  changing  and  reorganizing  transactions  among  governance  structures  is 
estimated to range from a few years to a decade. Finally, Level 4 institutions define the extent 
to which adjustment occurs through prices or quantities, and determine the resource allocation 
mechanism. Examples of this type of institutions are rules that are easy to change and that 
have an impact on resource allocation, employment, the social security system, etc (Jütting, 
2003, p.12-13).
There is also a third way of alternative classification for institutions in the literature 
based on the differentiation between various areas of analysis. Economic, political, legal and 
social  institutions  are  the  four categories  most  commonly  found  in  the  literature. Under 
economic institutions, authors usually place rules that define the production, allocation and 
distribution  process of goods and services, including  markets  (Bowles,  1998).  Studies of 
political institutions usually employ variables that provide details about elections, electoral 
rules,  type of political system,  party composition of  the  opposition  and  the  government, 
measures of checks and balances and political stability (Beck et al., 2002). Studies related to 
law  and  institutions  refer to the type of  legal  system,  the definition  and  enforcement of 
property rights and legal origin. Finally, studies on social institutions usually cover rules that 
have to do with access to health and education and social security arrangements, have an 16
impact on gender balance and govern  more generally  the  relationship between economic 
actors (Jütting, 2003, p.14).
In most of the recent articles, institutions are defined in a broader sense, linking 
various different  measures of  institutional  quality to  development outcomes  from  various 
angles and disciplines. These measures of institutions are discussed in the next section.
3.2. Methodologies
The resurgence of the cross-country literature on institutions and growth is clearly 
linked to two factors. The first is the availability of comparable measures of institutional 
quality  for  a  large set  of  countries, and second there  is  the use of instrumental variables 
techniques to deal with the endogeneity of institutions. However, the concept of 'institutions' 
is multifaceted  and  includes  the  working of  markets,  contract  enforceability,  bureaucratic 
efficiency,  risk  of  expropriation,  infrastructure  quality,  and  repudiation  of  contracts  by 
government; not surprisingly, such a broad  concept  is hard to pin down empirically.  So, 
although this is a rich and active literature, it is with m uch debate about the suitability of 
empirical  strategies  adopted  by  the  different  papers,  the  validity  of  their  identification 
assumptions and the relative magnitudes of the effects of different kinds of institutions on 
growth outcomes.
The empirical literature has adopted a variety of different measures of institutions.
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The most common are survey-based assessments of institutional quality and/or government 
effectiveness collected over the 1980s and 1990s. Such measures are typically derived from 
sources such as the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group's International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG), Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI), or the Economist Intelligence Unit, 
and are based on subjective assessments by experts of different aspects of the institutional 
environment, such as the corruption, law and order, and the protection of property rights.
For example, in their proxy for social infrastructure, Hall and Jones (1999) include a 
measure of government anti-diversionary policies (which includes data from the ICRG on law 
                                                  
24 Researchers  have  used  diverse  measures,  encompassing  political  instability,  the  attributes  of  p olitical 
institutions, social  characteristics, and social political,  and measures of the quality of institutions that affect 17
and  order,  bureaucratic  quality,  corruption,  the  risk  of  expropriation  and  government 
repudiation of contracts). Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) adopt the extent of legal protection of 
private property and enforcement of such laws as a proxy for institutions. They use the ICRG 
measure of protection against expropriation risk of private foreign investment by government.
Knack and Keefer (1995) also use this set of variables.
Another data set have been widely used to measure institutional quality is that of 
Kaufmann  et  al.  (2002,  2004,  2005)  who  construct  composite  index  of  six  different 
dimensions  of  institutional  quality  (voice  and  accountability,  political  stability  and  the 
absence of violence/corruption, government effectiveness, 'light' regulatory burden, rule of 
law, freedom from grant) from ratings by country experts (including the ICRGand BERI) and 
surveys. The Kaufmann et al. (2003) data on institutions are used, for example, by Rodrik et 
al. (2004) and Easterly and Levine (2003).
An alternative, and less commonly used, set of measures aims to capture the limits 
on  executive  power  of political  leaders.  The primary data source for a measure of such 
constraints is the Polity IV data set complied by two political scientists, Jaggers and Marshall 
(2000). Some measures focus on constitutional or electoral rules, such as the 'plurality' and
proportional representation variables constructed by Beck et al. (2002).
Glaeser et al. (2004) criticizes these measures of institutions at three points. One of 
them is that these three data sets measure outcomes, not permanent characteristics. They argue 
that all these measures 1) rise with per capita income, and 2) are highly volatile. So they 
conclude that both of these facts are inconsistent with the view that they measure permanent 
or even durable features of the political environment. Their second critic is about the first two 
measures. Accordingly, they emphasize to the point that these measures are constructed so 
that they lump dictatorships and democratic governments else together by making the same 
evaluations for the two system implementing good policies. However, Glaeser et al. (2004) 
points to the fact that dictators choose these policies freely, but others are constrained. So, 
according to authors, even if these measures are extremely useful indicators of policy choices, 
they are not constraints,  hence  they  are  unusable to discuss how specific constraints on 
                                                                                                                                                              
economic  exchange.  The  literature  on economic  growth  typically  has  classified  and  treated  those  proxies 
collectively as “sociopolitical measures” (Aron, 2000, p.103).18
government would guarantee the security of property rights. The variables of Polity IV data 
set  are similar for  them,  they show political outcomes  rather than durable characteristics. 
Thirdly, they criticize the point that the institutional outcomes used by scholars as measures of 
constraints have very little to do with the constitutional constraints, and so they argue that this 
is raising doubts about the effectiveness of changing political rules.    
These  measures of  the  quality  of  formal  and  informal  institutions  indicate  how 
effectively the existing institutional rules or norms are implemented. For example, subjective 
rankings of the effectiveness of property rights and of the bureaucracy (that is, the ease of 
doing  business),  which  are  often  drawn  from  cross-country  surveys  conducted  by 
abovementioned risk agencies, measures the quality of formal and informal institutions. These 
measures are actually the proxies for the transaction and transformation costs of production 
that may affect the volume and efficiency of investment and hence growth. But it is not easy 
to measure informal constraints. However, Putnam (1993) provides some measures for social 
capital  that tries  to capture the extent and  the quality of civic  activity and organization. 
Another example is the subjective Gastil index of civil freedoms. That index includes freedom 
of  press  and  of assembly  and  try  to  catch the indirect  effect of informal  constraints on 
economic growth. Like this one, some measures of social capital reflect the ability of citizens 
to hold the state accountable.
4. Institutional Structures and Regional Disparities
Although there are lot of studies which argue that “the institutional fabric” or “the 
institutional setting” is crucial to the economic development of a region or a local community, 
there are few studies that dip deeply into the questions of what institutions are, how they are 
constructed  and  constituted  and  how  they  work  to  promote  or  constrain  a  successful 
restructuring process in a local setting. (Dale and Nilsen, 2000, p.1). To contribute into the 
fulfillment of this gap within the existent literature, this section of the paper aims to discuss 
whether institutions really matter for regional economic growth and development, in other 
words, this section is an analytical attempt to discuss whether an institutionalist approach in 
studies of regional growth and development is relevant, and if so, how institutions can be 
included in the regional growth and development policies.
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Do institutions matter for regional economic growth and development? Until 1990s, 
this question has  not  been  deeply  questioned  by  either  theoreticians, policy-makers or 
decision-makers dealing with development issues. Despite the fact that the role of institutions 
has been analyzed by social scientists for more than a century (i.e. Tönnies, 1887; Weber, 
1920  and  1921),  the  linkage  between  institutions  and  economic  development  had  been 
ignored by  mainstream  economic  theory,  in  general,  and by growth  theory,  in particular. 
Achieving economic development was seen as fundamentally a matter of investing in physical 
capital under the neoclassical growth theory framework (Solow, 1956). While explaining the 
differences in output and in the progress of economic growth, differences in the stock and in 
the level of investment in infrastructure were accounted as the key elements (Aschauer, 1989). 
With the development of the endogenous growth theory around the mid-1980s, the role of 
other two additional factors (innovation [Romer, 1986] and education [Lucas, 1988]) has been 
started to be discussed in the literature. Hence, the prescription to foster economic growth and 
development and to advance welfare levels is seemed to be apparent: greater investment in 
infrastructure, in education and training, and in promotion innovation and industrial activities 
are sufficient to generate greater economic growth and, ultimately, development in theory.
And also,  for  the  regional  growth  and  development  context, it  is believed  that  if  these 
investments were channeled to lagging regions, it would also contribute to disappear income
disparities among regions and to provide economic convergence.
Strong national development policies based on the abovementioned principles were 
considered to have contributed to a substantial reduction in the disparities between rich and 
poor regions of especially developed countries. As it is highlighted by Amin (1999), “firm-
centered, standardized, incentive-based and state-driven” regional policies based on the belief 
that “a set of common factors (e.g. the rational individual, the maximizing entrepreneur, the 
firms as the basic economic unit and so  on)”  lay at  the base of economic success. As a 
consequence,  regional  development  policies have  remained very  much  embedded  in  the 
tradition of national development policies (Rodriguez-Pose, 2010, p.2). This is described as a 
tradition by Pike et al. (2006), which is firmly rooted in the belief that replicating top-down 
infrastructure, education, and industrialization policies, regardless of the local institutional 
contexts, would suffice to generate greater growth and promote economic convergence. The 
effect of institutions on regional development patterns was totally ignored by mainstream 
economic theory, instead it tended to assume that utility maximizing individuals satisfying 20
individual  preferences  would  result  in  efficient  and socially  optimal  outcomes.  Regional 
development policies in the world following this theoretical framework over the last 30 years 
could not went further to copy development strategies of one another by adopting this top-
down approach to development problems. But this approach have seemed to be adequate and 
logical at the time and so this neo-classical and endogenous growth approach to development 
had been tried and tested and had worked reasonably well.
However,  this  panorama  has  changed  over  the  last  two  decades.  Across  the 
developing world, increase in within county regional disparities has accelerated sharply since 
the  early  1990s.  And so, economists have started  to  be disagreed  on  whether  top-down 
regional  development  intervention  across  the  world  is delivering. Then,  not  only  from 
economics, but also from a wide range of social sciences, researchers have initiated to analyze 
the role of institutions in order to have a better grasp of how economic development takes 
place. As Rodriguez-Pose and Storper (2006) mentioned, stubbornly high – and often growing 
– residuals  in growth  regressions have  encouraged  many scholars  to  look  for  additional 
factors  that  impinge  on  economic  development  and  growth  beyond  traditional  growth 
theories. At the end of 1990s and at the early years of 2000s, mainstream economists have 
increasingly come to the conclusion that the new “kid on the block”, institutions, matter as 
much, if not more, for economic growth and development that long-established traditional 
factor-endowments, such as physical and human resource endowments, trade, or technology 
transfers (Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001a; Vijayaraghavan and Ward, 2001; 
Rodrik et al., 2002). As is the case with both the theoretical and empirical studies that were 
mentioned in the second section of that paper, are now trying to understand which type of 
institutions matter. Among the formal institutions, the property rights and the rule of law have 
been identified as playing the most relevant role in generating sustainable growth (Rodrik et 
al.,  2002; Acemoglu  et  al.,  2005).  Among  informal  institutions,  trust  (Knack and  Keefer, 
1997a; Knack, 2003; Beugelsdijk et al., 2004) and social capital (Putnam, 1993, 2000; Boix
and  Posner,  1998;  Beugelsdjik  and van Schaik,  2005)  have, so far, attracted  the  greatest 
attention.
To sum up, if the previous returns from regional growth and development efforts 
adopting  mainstream  economic  theory  framework are  controversial  and  contested,  if  the 
researchers have  found that  institutions  matter  more  and  more  for  economic  growth  and 21
development and if the regional development strategies should not overlook the institutional 
dimension,  institutions  should  become  an  essential  part  of  any  regional  growth  and 
development effort in order to improve its effectiveness.
Before asking what are in fact institutions to refine the definitions mentioned in the 
third section and how they affect economic growth and development in the regional context, 
this section first  continues to focus  on  the  role  of  institutions  in  economic  growth  and 
development. At the end, this section will deal with how can institutions be introduced into 
the development policy-making process and what are the problems related to it.
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Now,  the  belief  that  the  traditional  development  strategies  are  not  universally 
successful  and  the  regional  disparities  within  countries  continue  to  grow  despite  the 
government interventions in many parts of the world, is a worldwide phenomenon. So, the 
dominant thought is that many development initiatives concludes with the increasingly limited 
returns. Therefore, these traditional development strategies have been regarded as ineffective 
in today’s globalized world. Particularly in the case of lagging regions, it is proved that “one-
size-fits-all” approach does not work. However, while economists have attempted to look for 
the causes of the limited returns of development strategies and thus underdevelopment of 
lagging regions, the growing attention has been paid to the effects of institutions on economic 
development. North (1990), in his seminalbook, accused the western scholars (economists, in 
particular) and policy-makers of ignoring and taking the role of institutions in ensuring the 
efficient functioning of markets and, consequently, in fostering development for granted. He 
argued  that  institutions  are  the  underlying  determinant  of  the  long-run  performance of 
economies (North, 1990, p.107). With going even further, Rodrik et al. (2002) said that the 
quality  of  institutions  trumps  more  traditional  development  factors,  such  as  trade  or 
geography, in determining levels of income and growth prospects. Then both economists and 
other researchers from different perspectives have tried to establish linkages between “place-
specific  institutional  structures” and  “economic  performance”.  For  these  researchers, 
institutions generate trust among economic actors and reduce transition costs (North, 1991; 
Fukuyama, 2000, p.1), provide collective goods (Streeck, 1991), foster transparency (Storper, 
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efficient development strategies, it will also argue that the introduction of an institutional dimension into policy-
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2005,  p.32),  promote  entrepreneurship, grease  the  functioning of  labor  markets  (Giddens, 
1990),  adapt  in the face of shocks  in order to provide problems of solving arrangements 
(North, 1990), and ultimately lead to greater economic efficiency (North, 1992, p.479).
Especially  in the  regional  framework,  Streeck  (1991)  argued  that  specific  local 
institutional arrangements enable localities and regions to embark on a sustainable and high-
end road to economic development. In the same vein, Rodriguez-Pose (1999) argued that 
these institutional arrangements work better at the local and the regional scale, as the national 
scale  can  be  too  distant,  remote,  and  detached  in  order  to  be  effective  in  mobilizing 
organizations. Herein,  the  fundamental  thought  is t hat  adequate,  solid,  and  efficient
institutions are essential for economic development at a local or a regional scale. Researchers 
dealing with the institutionalist perspective on the regional development, such as Woolcock 
(1998) and Amin (1999), argued that communities, localities, and regions with inadequate or 
inefficient institutions have, in contrast, a low probability of achieving sustainable economic 
development. Within this respect, Amin (1999) stated that institutionally thin environments 
often  end  up  controlled  by  elites,  resulting  in  “institutional  sclerosis”  and  thwarting 
opportunities  for  sustainable  development.  And  this  institutional  sclerosis  spreads 
dissatisfaction  and distrust  in  the  local  public policy-making process, driving  local  actors 
away  from  the  development process  as  it  is  argued by Picciotto  (2000).  If  this situation 
persists,  within the terminology of  institutional  economics,  if  institutional  “lock-ins”  and 
“path dependencies” realize, they further contribute to generate a downward spiral of relative 
underdevelopment in lagging regions. That is to say, as Putnam said that, solid and efficient 
institutions are  the  key  enablers  of  innovation,  mutual  learning  and  productivity growth 
(Putnam, 2000, p.325) and thus pave the way for the design and implementation of efficient 
economic development strategies across territories and, ultimately, for economic growth and 
development.
The next questions while arguing that the institutions matter are what are institutions 
and which institutions matter for development. These questions are important because while 
investment  in i nfrastructure,  education,  or  innovation  tends  to  relatively  easy  to  grasp, 
operationalize, and implement; however, the concept of institutions is more subjective, less 
clear, more controversial and, precisely for that reason, much more difficult to operationalize. 
Under most normal circumstances, greater investment in infrastructure, education, innovation 23
is likely to produce positive outcomes on the economic development of any given region. But 
aiming to remove institutional deficiencies is much more difficult to achieve, especially if the 
necessary  institutions  should  have  certain  qualifications  as  “adequate”,  “solid”  and/or 
“efficient”. That means making institutions which ease voluntary and mutually advantageous 
exchange. So the following questions are how do we intervene institutions and how do we 
create “adequate”, “solid” and “efficient” institutions. Before addressing these questions, we 
must first define what is understood by institutions in the regional context.
As  it  was  largely  mentioned  in  Section  3,  the  current  literature  is  far  from  a 
consensus  on  a common definition of  institutions.  The  mostly cited definition belongs  to 
North (1990), which is “the rules of the game in a society; (and) more formally, (as) the 
humanly devised constraints  that  shape  human interaction”.  But this definition is n ot  a 
universally accepted one. With the existence of multiple types of institutions, the problems 
with definition come into being a more complicated work. Nevertheless, most of the literature 
on  the  topic  agrees  with  the  two-tier  division.  According  to  that  division,  one  part  of 
institutions have been described as “formal” or “hard” institutions or “society”, and the other 
part  of  institutions  have  been  called  as  “informal”,  “tacit”,  “soft”,  or  “community” 
institutions.  More  specifically,  “formal”  institutions  can  be  regarded  as  universal  and 
transferable rules and generally include constitutions, laws, charters, bylaws and regulations, 
as well as elements such as the rule of law and property rights and contract and competition 
monitoring systems (North, 1992; Fukuyama, 2000, p.6). Informal institutions consist a set of 
features of  group  life  such  as  “norms,  traditions  and  social  conventions,  interpersonal 
contracts,  relationships,  and  informal  networks”  (Rodriguez-Pose  and  Storper,  2006,  p.1) 
which are crucial for generating trust (Fukuyama, 2000, p.3). According to Fukuyama (2000), 
these  informal  institutions  tend  to  arise  spontaneously  through  repeated  community 
interaction and prisoner’s dilemma type decisions
26 and as a result of these interactions social 
capital  accumulates.
27 Different  researchers  have  focused  on  different  types  of  informal 
                                                  
26 Fukuyama  (2000:1)  also  states  that  although  social  capital  often  arises  from  iterated  Prisoner's  Dilemma 
games,  it  also  is  a  byproduct  of  re ligion,  tradition,  shared  historical  experience,  and  other  types  of  c ultural 
norms.
27 Before  Fukuyama  (2000),  while  answering  to  the  question  what  makes  it  necessary  to  constrain  human 
interaction with institutions, North (1991: 97) states that the issue can be most succinctly summarized in a game 
theoretic context: Wealth-maximizing individuals will usually find it worthwhile to cooperate with other players 
when the play is repeated, when they possess complete information  about the other player's past performance, 
and when there are small numbers of players. But turn the game upside down. Cooperation is difficult to sustain 24
institutional arrangements. Some of them have concentrated on social capital (defined as the 
features of social organization, such as networks, norms and trust) that ease the coordination 
and cooperation  for  mutual benefit  in  exchange.  Others have  concentrated on the  role of 
institutional thickness as the driver of economic development. Amin and Thrift (1994) defines 
the institutional thickness as a “combination of features including the presence of various 
institutions, inter-institutional interactions and a culture of represented identification with a 
common industrial purpose and shared norms and values which serve to constitute ‘the social 
atmosphere’ of a particular locality”. According to these authors, institutional thickness give 
institutions legitimacy, generate trust, increase the capacity of innovation, expand common 
knowledge, and help to embed economic activity in the local setting.
28
Now  it  is time  to describe  how  solid  and  efficient  institutions  foster  regional 
economic development.  Here,  the point of departure  is the  idea that  markets are  socially 
constructed (Bagnasco,  1988).  According  to the institutionalists,  markets  are not the free 
floating phenomena as  described  in  the  neo-classical  theory.  Differently,  they should  be 
considered  as  social  constructs  made  and  reproduced  through  frameworks  of  socially 
constructed institutions and conventions (Pike et al., 2006, p.91). Hence, the functions of local 
and regional institutions go beyond just being simple regulators of economic activity. They 
become an important determinant of the level of economic activity and its efficiency. That is 
why there is a strong belief that local institutions promote growth and development through 
creating the necessary conditions for investment, economic interaction, and trade; and at the 
same time, reduce the risk of social and political instability and conflict (Jütting, 2003). As 
their principal functions, by lowering uncertainty and information costs, institutions smooth 
the process of knowledge and innovation transfer within and across regions and improve the 
conditions for the development of economic activity (North, 1990, 1995a; Vazquez-Barquero, 
2002). Additionally, they shape the sets of incentives and  disincentives  that  contribute  to 
                                                                                                                                                              
when the game is not repeated (or there is an endgame), when information on the other players is lacking, and 
when there are large numbers of players.
28 Moreover, Amin  and Thrift  (1994) propose  fo ur  factors  contribute towards the construction of institutional 
thickness in a region. Firstly, there have to be a strong presence of a plethora of institutions of different kinds 
(including firms; financial institutions; local chambers of commerce; training agencies; trade associations; local
authorities; development  agencies; innovation centers;  clerical bodies, unions, government  agencies, business 
service  organizations;  marketing  boards).  Secondly,  the  institutions  involved  must  have  a  high  level  of  
interaction amongst each other. Thirdly, this high level of interaction must result in clear def ined structures of 
domination  and  coalition resulting in the collective representation of  what used to be sectional and individual 
interests. Finally, a mutual awareness of being involved in a common enterprise or “script” has to be developed.25
establish an “adequate” balance between coordination and competition among local economic 
actors,  hence  easing  the  learning  process  (North,  1995a).  Both  formal  and  informal 
institutions  assist  regions  to  adjust  and  react  to  change,  creating  a degree  of  “adaptive 
efficiency”  that  highlights  the  willingness  and  capacity  of  local  actors  to  adopt  new 
knowledge  and  to  engage  in i nnovative  and creative  activities  (North,  1990).  Moreover, 
according to Morgan (1997), institutions determine the learning capacity of any region more 
than any other factor.
In  addition to the  roles of  institutions on the  regional  development,  in a  general 
sense, there are also some roles for the different types of institutions. In accordance with our 
previous division for institutions as formal and informal ones in that section, we will shortly 
discuss the roles of and the interactions between formal and informal institutions. For some 
authors, the weight of formal and informal institutions in generating development is not equal. 
Greif (1994) argues that community institutions may become a useful substitute to society 
institutions in circumstances of weak formal institutions, as in times of conflict or when trust 
in  formal  institutions  has broken down.  But  for some other  authors,  formal  and  informal 
institutions are equal partners for the genesis of development and do not consider community-
type institutions as auxiliary. To Amin (1999), a solid development strategy requires a balance 
between formal and informal institutions. On the one hand, formal institutions are essential as 
they provide adequate incentives for growth by minimizing risk, uncertainty, and corruption. 
As a consequence, they also facilitate efficiency in economic performance (Chakravarti, 2005, 
p.28).  On  the  other  hand,  informal  institutions  can  not  only  substitute  for  weak  formal 
institutions,  they  are  alone  essential  for  the  reduction  of  transaction  costs,  for  rooting 
economic  activity  within  any  given  region,  and  for  enhancing  local  interdependencies, 
generating greater local economies of association (Amin and Thrift, 1994, p.230).
There can be also some regional settings  which have not  any solid and  efficient 
formal institutions but have efficient informal institutions. These informal institutions can 
improve government efficiency and lead to greater economic efficiency as well (Boix and 
Posner, 1998, p.689-693). Besides, formal institutions can also contribute to the improvement 
of informal institutions. And these interactions between formal and informal institutions can 
help to account for the differences in growth and developmental patterns followed by diverse 
regions and territories (Haris et al., 1995).26
Besides, many researchers working on the linkages between institutions and regional 
economic development have concluded that the density or thickness of local institutions is 
determinant on the potential outcomes of local and regional economic development strategies 
(e.g.  Hudson,  1994;  Amin  and  Thrift,  1994). These  authors  emphasize  the  regional 
institutional thickness due to their belief that it fosters the clustering of economic activities 
and  stimulate  entrepreneurship,  so  the  success  of  cluster  promotion  is  affected  by  the 
institutional thickness of the region. In a similar vein, Storper (1997) stressed the presence of 
untraded interdependencies to pronounce the fact that economic growth and development in a 
region  depend  on  shared  conventions  embedded  in t he  region  through  the  positive 
externalities generated by local institutions.
Therefore, it is needed to consider the importance of institutions and to be more 
responsive to the needs of the local institutional environment while designing development 
strategies for lagging regions. This necessity does not end up with the creation of institutions. 
To  make  them  work  continuously  and  efficiently  is c ritical  to  improve  the  economic 
efficiency and to get returns from interventions. Otherwise, the risk of failure always presents.
After we have agreed that institutions matter for the regional economic growth and 
development, last step is to discuss whether we can integrate institutions into the regional 
development policies and how. Since there is a strong belief amongst institutionalists that 
even the best development policy can be undermined by a poor institutional environment, 
here, some measures should be implemented for the improvement of institutional capacity for 
a  given  region.
29 However,  there  is l ittle  agreement  about  what  improving  institutional 
capacity and creating solid and efficient institutions really means and what to do in order to 
remove institutional inefficiency. As it was mentioned in the previous sections, there is also a 
lack of consensus as to whether institutions are a prerequisite or a natural outcome of growth 
and development. Due to its strong dependency on geographical conditions and historical 
past, it is hard to intervene in and affect institutions. At that point, literature proposes some 
factors that may affect the potential to intervene in institutional building.
                                                  
29 Aron (2000) states that if there is clear evidence that weak political and  economic institutions significantly 
hamper growth, policymakers might propose measures that strengthen institutions in particular ways  or that 
encourage more appropriate political structures.27
First, the measurement problem. Rodriguez-Pose (2010) states that measuring what 
are adequate, solid, and efficient institutions is virtually impossible. Fine (2000) supports the 
argument  of  Rodriguez-Pose  by  drawing  attention  to  a  myriad  of  complex  bilateral 
interrelations  lie  at  the  base  of  any  institutional  environment  and  he  argues  that  these 
interrelations are  affected  by  numerous  context-specific  factors,  making  local  institutional 
constructs intangible.
Second,  adequate  and  efficient  institutions  are  context- and  geography  specific. 
Geography exerts a significant effect on the type and quality of institutions (Easterly and 
Levine, 2003).
30 What is a solid and efficient institutional arrangement in one region, does not 
necessarily  mean  a  solid  and  efficient  institutional  in  another  (Chang,  2003).  And  this 
situation can be in reverse, in other words, different institutional settings can produce similar 
economic outcomes. So what are good institutional arrangements in one place may turn out to 
be bad in another.
Third, time also affects the role of institutions on economic growth and development. 
As Storper (2005) stated that as conditions change over time, what are good institutional 
forms at one stage are no longer appropriate at others. The adaptability of diverse institutional 
settings is therefore an essential characteristic of the efficiency institutions.
Fourth,  while  many  institutional  settings  can  adapt  to  time  and  move  into new 
equilibria, some of them can simultaneously resist to transformations in the short-term. So 
short-term  policy  interventions  may  not  be  realistic  to  shape  or  transform  all  types  of 
institutions.
Under these factors, nevertheless, there is a hope to insert institutions into regional 
development policies identifying the right mix – or density – of institutions. However, quality 
of institutions matters more than their density. As Hudson (1994) argued that the existence of 
local institutional thickness per se is no guarantee of local regeneration and development. On 
                                                  
30 In  considering the effects of  geography, Easterly  and Levine (2003)  conclude that geography/endowments 
explain  cross-country  differences  in  economic  development  but  only  through  their  impact  on  institutions 
(Frances, 2004, p.3).28
the other hand, the balance of formal and informal institutions is crucial. An excess of either 
formal  or  informal  institutions  may also be counterproductive  for  economic  development 
(Rodriguez-Pose, 2010). 
Another point with policy discussion is that the endogeneity problem. Institutional 
arrangements affect  economic  development,  but  also  in  part the  outcome  of  economic 
development affect the institutional arrangements. So, institutions and economic development 
are mutually reinforcing (Boix and Posner, 1998; Rodriguez-Pose and Storper, 2006) and it is 
difficult to predict the direction of causality at any given time and in any given region.
Additionally, the relationship between the institutions and the diverse components of 
economic development (such as infrastructure investment, human resources, or innovation) is 
uncertain  and  ambiguous.  As  Glaeser  et  al.  (2004)  stated  that  the  relationship  between 
economic development may be more than bidirectional.
Consequently,  the  above  discussion  has  made  clear  that  institutions  matter,  but 
bringing institutions into the regional development policy is not an easy task. The problems 
with measurement, space and time variability, the difficulties for defining  the right mix of 
formal  and  informal  institutions,  the  endogeneity  problem  between  institutions  and 
development  and  the  endogeneity  problem  between  institutions  and  the  components  of 
development make  it  impossible  to produce  “one  size  fits  all”  type  policy  framework. 
Therefore, a region-specific approach is certainly necessary designing development policies, 
and especially putting the institutional components into these policies. In addition, regional 
development  intervention  should  consider  the  need  to  promote  the  adaptability  of  local 
institutions to changing environments and conditions. 
5. An Empirical Exercise
As  it  is summarized  in  Section  2, the cross-country  literature on  institutions and 
growth has successfully  focused attention  on the complex  interactions  between economic 
growth and institutional development. This literature has uncovered important correlations 
across countries between growth and the nature and quality of core set of economic, political 
and social institutions. It has also been careful in noting, and accounting for, the fact that 
institutions and economic growth jointly cause each other. A positive correlation between 29
'good' institutions and growth may reflect reverse causation; faster growing countries may 
have 'better' institutions because they can afford them. Faced with the statistical challenge of 
isolating causal pathways, authors have been extraordinarily inventive in identifying features 
of countries that are plausibly exogenous to the growth process, but that might influence the 
character  of  institutional  development  and  thus  might  serve  as  instrumental  variables. 
Therefore, Pande and Udry (2005) argues that this literature has served its purpose and is 
essentially complete. This is because, they think that the number of variables available as 
instrumental variables is limited, and their coarseness prevents close analysis of particular
casual  mechanisms  from  institutions  to  growth.  Further,  they  emphasize  the  fact  that 
instruments tend to be derived from persistent features of a country's institutional environment 
such as its colonial past limits their usefulness for studying institutional change.
After all, this suggests that the research agenda identified by the institutions and 
growth literature is best furthered by the analysis of much more micro-data than has been 
typically been the norm in the literature.
As it was mentioned at initial pages of the study, the main aim of this paper is to 
contribute to a better understanding of the concept of institution and to reemphasize the value 
of an institutionalist approach in studies of regional economic development. This motivation 
of that study sources from the economic theory in which there are many studies considering 
the relationship between the growth and regions on the one hand, and there are many other 
studies  considering  the  relationship  between  the  growth  and  institutions  as  have been 
frequently mentioned in that paper. So far, however, institutional and regional topics have 
been analyzed separately in the empirical literature, so that the interaction among regions and 
institutions is not explicitly treated in the studies. In the previous section, this paper have tried 
to deal with the two aspects jointly revealing the qualitative linkages between them.
Differently,  this  section  of  the  paper aims  to  describe how  economy-induced 
variation in institutional form within a country, for instance within Turkey, can be exploited 
to examine  how  specific  institutions  influence  economic  outcomes of  regions  within  a 
country. An important advantage of that type of study is that information about how such 
change  was  implemented  across  regions in  the  country and/or  difference  in the regional 30
incidence  of  the  policy  can  very  often  be exploited  to  obtain  instruments  for  specific 
institutions.
The main research question of this paper is whether institutions matter in regional 
economic growth and development. To explore two important dimensions of this question, 
two hypotheses are tested. First one is whether the presence of some institutional structures 
does explain the growth and development disparities among regions in Turkey. Second one is 
whether the presence versus the quality of regional institutions does more account for the 
improvements in regional growth and development outcomes. To test these two hypotheses, 
panel data and analyses are employed. 
The data sets used in the analyses are extracted from the regional statistics of Turkish 
Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT).
31 These data sets have been collected in NUTS level 1, 2 
and 3 by TURKSTAT. For the purposes of the study done, data in NUTS level 2 for two time 
periods are analyzed, namely 2000-2001 and 2004-2006. This constraint in periods is due to 
lack of regional data in gross domestic products for all years. So, these figures are limited 
with the mentioned two periods.
32        
As it is abovementioned, panel regression analysis is used along the empirical parts 
of  this study.  Following  and  modifying the  model  proposed  by  Basu  (2008),  the model 
estimated in this section of thestudy is as follows:
D(Q)I  = α  + β I(Q)I  +β X   +ε  
where, D(Q)I   is development (quality) index in region i at time t of the current 
sample, α  is an unobserved time-invariant region-specific heterogeneity term, I(Q)I   is the 
institutional (quality) index; X   is the vector of other control variables, and ε   is a random 
error term.
                                                  
31 These data set are publicly available (http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/Bolgesel/menuAction.do).
32 While we can get the gross domestic product (GDP) numbers for 2000-2001 period, we have only gross value 
added (GVA) numbers for 2004-2006 period. In fact, TURKSTAT publishes the GDP numbers of provinces for 
the period between 1987-2001, but the number of total provinces in Turkey is under 81 up to 2000. To make an 31
There are two main factors behind the rationale of using this model. First one is 
about the extent of regional development.  This study  does not limit  the  measurement of 
regional development level with only regional gross domestic product statistics. Since the 
development is a broader concept than GDP growth, this study aims to consider the other 
dimensions of development, such as health, education and infrastructure. So the dependent 
variable is constructed as an index composed with these dimensions of development rather 
than being just a single value of growth. Second rationale is about the discussion whether 
quantities or qualities of institutions matter in development. This is an empirical question and 
this model used in this study propose to test this distinction, first,  with using normal indices 
of  development  and  institutions  which  reflect the quantitative side  of this c oncepts,  and 
second, with using quality indices of development and institutions which aim to reflect the 
qualitative side of this concepts.
Therefore,  the variables  will  be used  for  the estimations are  tried  to  be  chosen 
considering these rationales. However, due to lack of regional studies in terms of statistical 
data gathering, the data set of TURKSTAT does not provide so many options while choosing 
these variables, it is so limited to work with regions. According the statistical division, Turkey 
is composed with 12 NUTS1, 26 NUTS2 and 81 NUTS3 level regions (see Figure 1 and 
Table 2 in Appendix 2 for these regions). To make an economic development comparison of 
regions for Turkey just with employing gross economic indicators, we are limited with two 
main indicators, namely gross domestic product and gross value added. However, data sets of 
TURKSTAT including these indicators do not let us to track their year-to-year movements. 
We have GDP numbers for provinces (NUTS3 level regions) for the period between 1987 and 
2001. But these numbers do not include all the data of 81 provinces for the whole period. This 
is due to newly created provinces within time. We can reach the GDP data of all 81 provinces 
just with 2000. So our first period under investigation is composed only with years 2000 and 
2001. These GDP data for these 81 provinces are aggregated into 26 NUTS2 level regions by 
using the statistical-regional division of TURKSTAT. The other problem is with the missing 
time series data. TURKSTAT does not give us regional GDP numbers after 2001. Moreover,
after  2001, up  to  2004,  we  do  not  have  any  macroeconomic indicator  to  compare  the 
economic development of regions.With 2004, we have gross value added (GVA) numbers for 
                                                                                                                                                              
aggregation  with the 81 provinces building  fo r 26  NUTS2 level regions, we must  constrain the data set with 
these time periods.32
NUTS2 level regions. But unfortunately, these data only include the years 2004, 2005, and 
2006. Again, after 2006, we have not any data until today. So in sum, our analysis is limited 
with only 5 years period (2000-2001 and 2004-2006) due to lack of consistent time series data 
for NUTS2 level regions. This was the data problem to find the numbers dependent variables.
The  construction  of  independent variables  is much  more  problematic. When  we 
document the whole data set of TURKSTAT, we can find data under these main headings: 
general  information  (area  of  regions,  number  of  municipalities,  districts  and  villages), 
population and migration (general population censuses, address based population registration 
system,  migration  statistics),  demography,  building,  education  (primary  and  secondary 
education,  higher  education),  culture,  tourism,  health,  justice,  environment,  elections, 
agriculture, energy,  labour  force,  business statics,  transportation,  foreign  trade, prices  and 
indexes, and purchasing power parity. At first sight, it seems very rich data set to construct 
appropriate independent variables, however, when we examine the contents of these data sets, 
usual disappointments start to appear. One of them is about the time inconsistency between 
dependent and independent variables. Majority of the data sets are recently gathered ones and 
do cover heavily the years after 2007. For the variables fixed in time, like the area of a given 
region,  this  is not  a problem,  but  for  the  variables  change  in time  this creates a time-
inconsistency problem. Available years of data for dependent and independent variables do 
not match properly. This needs to a mandatory selection process among variables without full 
commitment to the model followed. Even worse, although we are able to construct a few
independent variables for the period 2004-2006, we can’t do it for the period 2000-2001. 
TURKSTAT data sets do not provide us any time-variant independent variables for that term. 
So, for now, our empirical exercise will be limited with only the period 2004-2006. Under 
these constraints, the independent variables available for the econometric analyses of that 
term are: openness,
33 the number of metropolitan municipalities, the number of parliament 
members, the number of parliament members in the ruling party, non-institutional population, 
working age population, labor force, the number of employed people, employment by sectors 
(agriculture,  industry,  trade,  services), the  number  of  unemployed  people,  labor  force 
participation  rate,  unemployment  rate,  employment  rate,  the  number  of  non-participants, 
public investments, the number of schools (primary and secondary), the number of teachers
                                                  
33 The openness indicator is constructed by thedivision of total trade to the gross value added for a given region.
Although this is not a good indicator for trade openness, we should accept that it is better than its absence.33
(primary and secondary), the number of classrooms (primary and secondary), the number of 
students (primary  and secondary),  the number  of undergraduate  students, the  number  of 
instructors (in higher education), the number of hospital beds, the number of health workers
(doctors, nurses, etc.).
To test the hypotheses of this study, using the independent variables mentioned, the 
panel data estimations have been done for the period 2004-2006. Some of these independent 
variables are used to  test the first hypothesis  which  investigates the significance of  the 
presence of some institutional structures in revealing the economic development disparities 
among regions. Additionally, some other independent variables are derived to test whether the 
presence versus the qualities of these institutional structures matter to explain the regional 
disparities. The list of these independent variables and the results of econometric findings are 
presented in Appendix 3.
The detailed interpretations about the econometric findings will not given within the 
text. The results are given in Appendix 3. This is because the emphasize of this study is much 
more on the intuition rather than the numerical results of empirical findings. Moreover, our 
data sets do not give us an opportunity to make a concrete empirical analysis about these 
institutional concerns. They are just like the stock numbers in a firm and after all they are  just 
quasi-proxiesof some economic and social development indicators.
According to the results of this paper, it seems that institutions (economic, political, 
social) matter (significant) in regional economic growth and development levels of Turkey. 
Implicitly,  the  presence of some  institutional  structures partially  explains the growth  and 
development gaps among regions in Turkey. Additionally, the qualities of institutions does 
more matter than the presence of institutions.       
6. Conclusion
This study  is an attempt to understand the  linkages between the institutions and 
economic performances in both cross-country and within-county settings. For this aim, first, 
the importance of institutions has been reemphasized outlining the studies consider the role of 
institutions  in economic  growth  and  development.  These studies  explored  have different 34
methodologies. Some of them were just using the comparative historical analysis, some of 
them were employing the newly aggregated data sets both in the international sphere and in 
the sub-national levels and conducting empirical analyses to test whether institutions matter 
for the economic performances of the countries or the regions considered. Given the results of 
these studies in the theoretical and empirical literature, this paper has tried to reveal linkages 
between the institutions  and growth/development.  According  to  that survey,  it  has  been 
concluded that 'institutions matter' for growth and development. But, however, the direction 
of causality isn'tunidirectional. While countries or regions have good economic performances 
and so have high and sustainable growth rates afford to construct good institutions, other 
countries or regions with worse growth performances have not able produce good institutional 
settings due to other problems sourcing from low levels of development. This problem within 
the studies concerning about the role of institutions, nevertheless has not slowed down the 
pace of research in the literature. Contrary, many studies have newly initiated to consider the 
concept  'institutions'  and  according  to  their  conceptions  about the  institutions, they have 
commented about various possible functions of institutions. One step further, these studies 
have tried to perform empirical studies to quantify the institutions and to test the hypotheses 
which argue the institutions are crucial in creating welfare in a given country or in a given 
region in the long-run. This was initially not an easy task. This is largely due to scarcity of 
data. Over time, some data sets have appeared in the literature. The majority of these data sets 
are considering the institutional quality of many countries from all over the world. The data 
sets were heavily constructed by rating firms which sells these data to the investors who are 
interested  with  the  institutional  quality  of  any  given  country  they  think  about  to  make 
investments  in  the  near  future.  So  these  firms  have  created  data  sets  ranking  countries 
according to their institutional qualities assessing from different viewpoints. But these sets 
could not refrain to being subjective in their analyses. This w as actually normal. When we 
come to the analysis of institutions in the regional sphere, indeed we have not met with a 
different  type of analysis. A  limited number  of  countries  which have some institutional 
quality evaluation in its internal regions, has been empirically analyzed to test whether the 
sources of regional economic disparities are institutions or not. Given the homogeneity of 
formal institutions across the regions within the countries, here the questions were generally 
asked about the informal institutions of the regions. Mostly emphasized term here was the 
social capital. Studies considering the regional differentiations within a given country mostly 
concluded  that  the  social  capital  accumulation  has  created  the  economic  performance 35
disparities among regions. Although some empirical results have appeared in the literature 
and in this study, for the policy implication, this paper and the other papers in the literature 
have been unable to go beyond to say that institutions matter and regional policies should 
consider the differences in the institutional structures of the regions in a given country.36
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Source: Pande and Udry (2005)
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One SD increase 
in index of social 
infrastructure 
(0.25) increases 
output per worker 
by 126% (OLS) 
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One SD increase 
in constraints on 
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Source: Pande and Udry (2005)41
Appendix 2: Statistical Regions of Turkey
Figure 1: Statistical Regions of Turkey (NUTS Level 2)
Source: EUROSTAT (2007)42
Table 2: Statistical Regions of Turkey (NUTS Level 1, 2 and 3)
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
TR Turkey
TR1 İstanbul TR10 (İstanbul) TR100 İstanbul





TR22 (Balıkesir, Çanakkale) TR221 Balıkesir
TR222 Çanakkale
TR3 Aegean  TR31 (İzmir) TR310 İzmir
























TR5 West Anatolia TR51 (Ankara) TR510 Ankara
TR52 (Konya, Karaman) TR521 Konya
TR522 Karaman
























Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
















TR9 East Black TR90 (Trabzon, Ordu, 














































SUM 12 26 81
Source: www.turkstat.gov.tr44
Table 3: Regional GVA - By Kind of Economic Activity (2004-2006)
                                            
Statistical 
Region Level 2 




Agriculture Industry Services GVA Agriculture Industry Services GVA Agriculture Industry Services GVA
TR Türkiye 52.997.645 138.411.772 303.474.641 494.884.058 60.713.747 160.331.023 350.669.700 571.714.470 62.662.754 188.646.805 417.108.706 668.418.265
TR10 İstanbul 516.413 39.722.501 97.206.711 137.445.626 584.429 45.767.765 110.391.695 156.743.890 552.211 53.490.114 129.769.948 183.812.274
TR21 Tekirdağ 2.039.616 4.069.217 6.293.006 12.401.839 2.215.329 4.883.715 7.752.412 14.851.456 2.218.415 6.007.980 9.453.452 17.679.847
TR22 Balıkesir 2.567.857 2.123.558 5.454.407 10.145.822 2.994.741 2.391.695 6.362.771 11.749.207 2.870.071 2.639.807 7.558.935 13.068.814
TR31 İzmir 2.007.842 10.164.121 21.294.693 33.466.656 2.028.801 11.520.529 24.576.688 38.126.018 2.418.970 12.741.178 29.216.505 44.376.653
TR32 Aydın 3.602.734 4.741.237 10.608.036 18.952.007 3.682.462 5.270.599 12.441.431 21.394.492 4.463.560 6.156.930 14.719.643 25.340.132
TR33 Manisa 3.873.883 5.510.971 7.814.625 17.199.480 4.491.608 6.455.603 9.345.744 20.292.956 4.711.300 7.849.837 11.359.216 23.920.353
TR41 Bursa 2.462.571 13.196.258 15.570.889 31.229.718 2.933.257 15.496.025 18.629.796 37.059.077 2.855.878 19.005.300 22.523.625 44.384.803
TR42 Kocaeli 2.365.149 12.021.659 14.561.576 28.948.384 2.718.672 13.524.813 17.637.365 33.880.850 2.937.668 16.185.419 21.705.728 40.828.815
TR51 Ankara 1.426.314 10.507.679 29.790.066 41.724.058 1.626.603 11.797.453 34.128.462 47.552.518 1.613.190 14.025.209 41.182.517 56.820.917
TR52 Konya 2.931.178 2.969.751 5.995.024 11.895.953 3.263.435 3.435.121 6.950.404 13.648.959 3.260.428 3.790.429 8.452.424 15.503.281
TR61 Antalya 3.140.996 2.835.729 13.449.844 19.426.569 3.600.394 3.558.050 15.635.144 22.793.587 3.996.228 4.157.114 18.394.493 26.547.835
TR62 Adana 3.491.006 4.629.543 11.999.922 20.120.471 4.347.767 5.394.126 13.675.025 23.416.918 4.466.842 6.307.753 16.405.820 27.180.415
TR63 Hatay 2.385.571 3.002.901 6.647.464 12.035.936 2.879.979 3.463.285 7.614.738 13.958.002 2.746.506 4.138.099 8.689.889 15.574.494
TR71 Kırıkkale 2.174.779 1.734.293 3.744.427 7.653.499 2.382.465 2.013.578 4.394.263 8.790.307 2.257.434 2.411.718 5.239.216 9.908.368
TR72 Kayseri 2.080.779 3.346.651 6.353.168 11.780.597 2.280.393 3.761.820 7.296.641 13.338.854 2.127.932 4.396.639 8.800.754 15.325.325
TR81 Zonguldak 502.223 3.047.038 3.977.042 7.526.303 546.768 3.683.786 4.738.624 8.969.178 527.181 4.140.785 5.716.985 10.384.952
TR82 Kastamonu 1.121.197 803.228 2.364.169 4.288.594 1.117.278 888.418 2.545.447 4.551.143 1.107.713 1.128.247 2.813.843 5.049.803
TR83 Samsun 3.166.803 2.739.924 8.020.840 13.927.568 3.515.703 3.275.726 9.241.580 16.033.008 3.575.303 4.081.432 11.011.962 18.668.697
TR90 Trabzon 1.840.518 2.711.613 7.868.751 12.420.882 2.729.056 3.317.324 9.128.554 15.174.935 2.986.636 3.619.881 10.782.765 17.389.282
TRA1 Erzurum 1.111.914 830.768 2.793.189 4.735.871 1.116.668 868.028 3.107.827 5.092.524 1.120.145 996.590 3.811.336 5.928.071
TRA2 Ağrı 1.167.669 401.283 1.816.996 3.385.948 1.210.050 533.473 2.143.688 3.887.211 1.227.654 616.795 2.549.662 4.394.111
TRB1 Malatya 1.045.234 1.443.290 4.278.373 6.766.898 1.510.032 1.638.535 4.823.576 7.972.143 1.317.021 1.843.698 5.652.436 8.813.155
TRB2 Van 1.232.822 878.473 2.953.030 5.064.326 1.512.998 1.058.483 3.388.596 5.960.077 1.519.596 1.112.819 3.869.902 6.502.317
TRC1 Gaziantep 962.451 2.344.792 4.728.023 8.035.266 1.347.796 2.805.284 5.497.972 9.651.052 1.473.843 3.339.710 6.326.373 11.139.925
TRC2 Şanlıurfa 2.731.977 1.490.874 5.131.863 9.354.714 2.936.917 1.707.333 5.875.127 10.519.376 3.089.800 1.941.369 6.995.904 12.027.073
TRC3 Mardin 1.048.149 1.144.420 2.758.507 4.951.075 1.140.145 1.820.456 3.346.131 6.306.733 1.221.227 2.521.953 4.105.372 7.848.552
Source: www.turkstat.gov.tr45
Table 4: Regional GVA - Share of Regions by Sectors (2004-2006)
Statistical 
Region Level 2 




Agriculture Industry Services GVA Rank Agriculture Industry Services GVA Rank Agriculture Industry Services GVA Rank
TR Türkiye 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
TR10 İstanbul 1,0 28,7 32,0 27,8 1 1,0 28,5 31,5 27,4 1 0,9 28,4 31,1 27,5 1
TR21 Tekirdağ 3,8 2,9 2,1 2,5 12 3,6 3,0 2,2 2,6 12 3,5 3,2 2,3 2,6 11
TR22 Balıkesir 4,8 1,5 1,8 2,1 16 4,9 1,5 1,8 2,1 16 4,6 1,4 1,8 2,0 16
TR31 İzmir 3,8 7,3 7,0 6,8 3 3,3 7,2 7,0 6,7 3 3,9 6,8 7,0 6,6 4
TR32 Aydın 6,8 3,4 3,5 3,8 8 6,1 3,3 3,5 3,7 8 7,1 3,3 3,5 3,8 8
TR33 Manisa 7,3 4,0 2,6 3,5 9 7,4 4,0 2,7 3,5 9 7,5 4,2 2,7 3,6 9
TR41 Bursa 4,6 9,5 5,1 6,3 4 4,8 9,7 5,3 6,5 4 4,6 10,1 5,4 6,6 3
TR42 Kocaeli 4,5 8,7 4,8 5,8 5 4,5 8,4 5,0 5,9 5 4,7 8,6 5,2 6,1 5
TR51 Ankara 2,7 7,6 9,8 8,4 2 2,7 7,4 9,7 8,3 2 2,6 7,4 9,9 8,5 2
TR52 Konya 5,5 2,1 2,0 2,4 14 5,4 2,1 2,0 2,4 14 5,2 2,0 2,0 2,3 14
TR61 Antalya 5,9 2,0 4,4 3,9 7 5,9 2,2 4,5 4,0 7 6,4 2,2 4,4 4,0 7
TR62 Adana 6,6 3,3 4,0 4,1 6 7,2 3,4 3,9 4,1 6 7,1 3,3 3,9 4,1 6
TR63 Hatay 4,5 2,2 2,2 2,4 13 4,7 2,2 2,2 2,4 13 4,4 2,2 2,1 2,3 13
TR71 Kırıkkale 4,1 1,3 1,2 1,5 19 3,9 1,3 1,3 1,5 20 3,6 1,3 1,3 1,5 20
TR72 Kayseri 3,9 2,4 2,1 2,4 15 3,8 2,3 2,1 2,3 15 3,4 2,3 2,1 2,3 15
TR81 Zonguldak 0,9 2,2 1,3 1,5 20 0,9 2,3 1,4 1,6 19 0,8 2,2 1,4 1,6 19
TR82 Kastamonu 2,1 0,6 0,8 0,9 25 1,8 0,6 0,7 0,8 25 1,8 0,6 0,7 0,8 25
TR83 Samsun 6,0 2,0 2,6 2,8 10 5,8 2,0 2,6 2,8 10 5,7 2,2 2,6 2,8 10
TR90 Trabzon 3,5 2,0 2,6 2,5 11 4,5 2,1 2,6 2,7 11 4,8 1,9 2,6 2,6 12
TRA1 Erzurum 2,1 0,6 0,9 1,0 24 1,8 0,5 0,9 0,9 24 1,8 0,5 0,9 0,9 24
TRA2 Ağrı 2,2 0,3 0,6 0,7 26 2,0 0,3 0,6 0,7 26 2,0 0,3 0,6 0,7 26
TRB1 Malatya 2,0 1,0 1,4 1,4 21 2,5 1,0 1,4 1,4 21 2,1 1,0 1,4 1,3 21
TRB2 Van 2,3 0,6 1,0 1,0 22 2,5 0,7 1,0 1,0 23 2,4 0,6 0,9 1,0 23
TRC1 Gaziantep 1,8 1,7 1,6 1,6 18 2,2 1,7 1,6 1,7 18 2,4 1,8 1,5 1,7 18
TRC2 Şanlıurfa 5,2 1,1 1,7 1,9 17 4,8 1,1 1,7 1,8 17 4,9 1,0 1,7 1,8 17
TRC3 Mardin 2,0 0,8 0,9 1,0 23 1,9 1,1 1,0 1,1 22 1,9 1,3 1,0 1,2 22
Source: www.turkstat.gov.tr46
Table 5: Regional GVA - Sectorel Share of Gross Value Added (2004-2006)
Statistical 
Region Level 2 




Agriculture Industry Services GVA Agriculture Industry Services GVA Agriculture Industry Services GVA
TR Türkiye 10,7 28,0 61,3 100 10,6 28,0 61,3 100 9,4 28,2 62,4 100
TR10 İstanbul 0,4 28,9 70,7 100 0,4 29,2 70,4 100 0,3 29,1 70,6 100
TR21 Tekirdağ 16,4 32,8 50,7 100 14,9 32,9 52,2 100 12,5 34,0 53,5 100
TR22 Balıkesir 25,3 20,9 53,8 100 25,5 20,4 54,2 100 22,0 20,2 57,8 100
TR31 İzmir 6,0 30,4 63,6 100 5,3 30,2 64,5 100 5,5 28,7 65,8 100
TR32 Aydın 19,0 25,0 56,0 100 17,2 24,6 58,2 100 17,6 24,3 58,1 100
TR33 Manisa 22,5 32,0 45,4 100 22,1 31,8 46,1 100 19,7 32,8 47,5 100
TR41 Bursa 7,9 42,3 49,9 100 7,9 41,8 50,3 100 6,4 42,8 50,7 100
TR42 Kocaeli 8,2 41,5 50,3 100 8,0 39,9 52,1 100 7,2 39,6 53,2 100
TR51 Ankara 3,4 25,2 71,4 100 3,4 24,8 71,8 100 2,8 24,7 72,5 100
TR52 Konya 24,6 25,0 50,4 100 23,9 25,2 50,9 100 21,0 24,4 54,5 100
TR61 Antalya 16,2 14,6 69,2 100 15,8 15,6 68,6 100 15,1 15,7 69,3 100
TR62 Adana 17,4 23,0 59,6 100 18,6 23,0 58,4 100 16,4 23,2 60,4 100
TR63 Hatay 19,8 24,9 55,2 100 20,6 24,8 54,6 100 17,6 26,6 55,8 100
TR71 Kırıkkale 28,4 22,7 48,9 100 27,1 22,9 50,0 100 22,8 24,3 52,9 100
TR72 Kayseri 17,7 28,4 53,9 100 17,1 28,2 54,7 100 13,9 28,7 57,4 100
TR81 Zonguldak 6,7 40,5 52,8 100 6,1 41,1 52,8 100 5,1 39,9 55,1 100
TR82 Kastamonu 26,1 18,7 55,1 100 24,5 19,5 55,9 100 21,9 22,3 55,7 100
TR83 Samsun 22,7 19,7 57,6 100 21,9 20,4 57,6 100 19,2 21,9 59,0 100
TR90 Trabzon 14,8 21,8 63,4 100 18,0 21,9 60,2 100 17,2 20,8 62,0 100
TRA1 Erzurum 23,5 17,5 59,0 100 21,9 17,0 61,0 100 18,9 16,8 64,3 100
TRA2 Ağrı 34,5 11,9 53,7 100 31,1 13,7 55,1 100 27,9 14,0 58,0 100
TRB1 Malatya 15,4 21,3 63,2 100 18,9 20,6 60,5 100 14,9 20,9 64,1 100
TRB2 Van 24,3 17,3 58,3 100 25,4 17,8 56,9 100 23,4 17,1 59,5 100
TRC1 Gaziantep 12,0 29,2 58,8 100 14,0 29,1 57,0 100 13,2 30,0 56,8 100
TRC2 Şanlıurfa 29,2 15,9 54,9 100 27,9 16,2 55,9 100 25,7 16,1 58,2 100
TRC3 Mardin 21,2 23,1 55,7 100 18,1 28,9 53,1 100 15,6 32,1 52,3 100
Source: www.turkstat.gov.tr47
Table 6: Regional GVA - Per Capita Gross Value Added(2004-2006)
Statistical 
Region Level 2 
/By Kind of 
Economic 
Activity
Per Capita GVA (TL) Per Capita GVA ($)
2004 Rank 2005 Rank 2006 Rank 2004 Rank 2005 Rank 2006 Rank
TR Türkiye 7.306 8.336 9.628 5.102 6.185 6.684
TR10 İstanbul 11.481 1 12.902 1 14.914 1 8.017 1 9.573 1 10.352 1
TR21 Tekirdağ 9.164 6 10.734 5 12.504 5 6.399 6 7.965 5 8.680 5
TR22 Balıkesir 6.474 10 7.455 10 8.248 10 4.521 10 5.531 10 5.725 10
TR31 İzmir 9.385 5 10.541 6 12.099 6 6.554 5 7.821 6 8.398 6
TR32 Aydın 7.600 8 8.453 9 9.868 9 5.307 8 6.272 9 6.850 9
TR33 Manisa 5.722 13 6.787 11 8.048 11 3.996 13 5.036 11 5.586 11
TR41 Bursa 9.852 4 11.482 3 13.509 3 6.880 4 8.519 3 9.377 3
TR42 Kocaeli 10.320 2 11.785 2 13.862 2 7.207 2 8.744 2 9.622 2
TR51 Ankara 9.934 3 11.117 4 13.047 4 6.937 3 8.248 4 9.056 4
TR52 Konya 5.494 14 6.282 13 7.115 13 3.837 14 4.661 13 4.938 13
TR61 Antalya 8.475 7 9.738 7 11.110 7 5.918 7 7.225 7 7.712 7
TR62 Adana 5.802 12 6.675 12 7.661 12 4.052 12 4.953 12 5.318 12
TR63 Hatay 4.524 19 5.144 19 5.629 19 3.159 19 3.816 19 3.907 19
TR71 Kırıkkale 5.209 15 5.965 16 6.705 17 3.638 15 4.426 16 4.654 17
TR72 Kayseri 5.157 16 5.827 17 6.683 18 3.601 16 4.323 17 4.639 18
TR81 Zonguldak 7.475 9 8.877 8 10.247 8 5.220 9 6.587 8 7.113 8
TR82 Kastamonu 5.897 11 6.240 14 6.906 15 4.118 11 4.630 14 4.794 15
TR83 Samsun 5.037 17 5.815 18 6.794 16 3.518 17 4.315 18 4.716 16
TR90 Trabzon 5.032 18 6.129 15 7.004 14 3.514 18 4.547 15 4.862 14
TRA1 Erzurum 4.243 21 4.606 21 5.416 21 2.963 21 3.418 21 3.760 21
TRA2 Ağrı 2.992 24 3.427 24 3.867 25 2.089 24 2.543 24 2.684 25
TRB1 Malatya 4.372 20 5.100 20 5.583 20 3.053 20 3.784 20 3.876 20
TRB2 Van 2.727 25 3.159 26 3.392 26 1.904 25 2.344 26 2.355 26
TRC1 Gaziantep 3.860 22 4.524 22 5.098 22 2.695 22 3.357 22 3.539 22
TRC2 Şanlıurfa 3.430 23 3.756 23 4.183 23 2.395 23 2.787 23 2.904 23
TRC3 Mardin 2.701 26 3.391 25 4.159 24 1.886 26 2.516 25 2.887 24
Source: www.turkstat.gov.tr48
Appendix 3: An Empirical Exercise
Table 7: Balanced Panel Data for 2004-2006
panelvar:  10, 21, ..., 123                                  n =         26
datevar:  2004, 2005, ..., 2006                             T =          3
           Delta(datevar) = 1 unit
           Span(datevar)  = 3 periods
           (panelvar*datevar uniquely identifies each observation)
Distribution of T_i:   min      5%     25%       50%       75%     95%     max
                         3       3       3         3         3       3       3
     Freq.  Percent    Cum. |  Pattern
---------------------------+---------
       26    100.00  100.00 |  111
---------------------------+---------
       26    100.00         |  XXX
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for Variables
Variable         |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+----------------
gva_tl   overall |  2.23e+07   3.02e+07    3385948   1.84e+08 |     N =      78
         between |             3.03e+07    3889090   1.59e+08 |     n =      26
         within  |              4556353     366502   4.67e+07 |     T =       3
                 |                                            |
gva_pc~l overall |  7204.115   3053.984       2701      14914 |     N =      78
         between |             2958.679   3092.667      13099 |     n =      26
         within  |             894.6549   5441.782   9098.782 |     T =       3
                 |                                            |
openness overall |  .1491322   .1746258   .0071566   .7135972 |     N =      78
         between |             .1762133   .0075512   .7073123 |     n =      26
         within  |             .0157981   .0721243   .2069685 |     T =       3
                 |                                            |
metro    overall |  .6153846   .6881326          0          2 |     N =      78
         between |             .6972473          0          2 |     n =      26
         within  |                    0   .6153846   .6153846 |     T =       3
                 |                                            |
pm_2002  overall |  21.19231   11.21462         10         70 |     N =      78
         between |             11.36317         10         70 |     n =      26
         within  |                    0   21.19231   21.19231 |     T =       3
                 |                                            |
pm_rp_~2 overall |  13.76923   7.355399          4         43 |     N =      78
         between |             7.452826          4         43 |     n =      26
         within  |                    0   13.76923   13.76923 |     T =       3
                 |                                            |
non_in~p overall |    2585.5   2110.869        706      12278 |     N =      78
         between |             2138.485        710      12168 |     n =      26
         within  |             37.84635     2474.5     2695.5 |     T =       3
                 |                                            |
wap      overall |  1859.962   1596.585        536       9219 |     N =      78
         between |             1617.156   554.6667   9054.333 |     n =      26
         within  |             42.59575   1698.628   2024.628 |     T =       3
                 |                                            |
lf       overall |  861.7821   744.4082        205       4295 |     N =      78
         between |             753.3254        238   4167.667 |     n =      26
         within  |              37.2096   711.1154   989.1154 |     T =       3
                 |                                            |
emp      overall |  770.7692   656.0098        183       3808 |     N =      78
         between |             663.5934   219.6667       3679 |     n =      26
         within  |             37.82118   612.7692   899.7692 |     T =       3
                 |                                            |
emp_agr  overall |  202.2564   138.4115         14        680 |     N =      78
         between |             136.9193         15   617.6667 |     n =      26
         within  |             29.96318   133.9231   283.9231 |     T =       3
                 |                                            |
emp_ind  overall |  200.4487   294.3733         15       1582 |     N =      78
         between |             297.8521   16.66667   1549.667 |     n =      26
         within  |             15.62188   140.7821   239.1154 |     T =       349
                 |                                            |
emp_tra  overall |  164.8333   176.0965         27        984 |     N =      78
         between |              178.077   29.66667        954 |     n =      26
         within  |             11.05555   123.8333   194.8333 |     T =       3
                 |                                            |
emp_ser  overall |  203.2949   218.3875         51       1234 |     N =      78
         between |             220.7412   54.33333   1160.667 |     n =      26
         within  |             15.23325   144.6282   276.6282 |     T =       3
                 |                                            |
unemp    overall |        91   94.15613          5        497 |     N =      78
         between |             95.03263   10.66667   489.3333 |     n =      26
         within  |             8.291758   61.66667        114 |     T =       3
                 |                                            |
lfpr     overall |  46.21795   6.842661         30         66 |     N =      78
         between |             6.523082         34   63.66667 |     n =      26
         within  |             2.318755   40.55128   56.55128 |     T =       3
                 |                                            |
ur       overall |   10.0641   3.909163          2         19 |     N =      78
         between |             3.683017   3.333333   17.33333 |     n =      26
         within  |             1.438494   5.064103    15.0641 |     T =       3
                 |                                            |
er       overall |  41.73077   7.379637         25         61 |     N =      78
         between |             7.047786   30.33333   59.66667 |     n =      26
         within  |             2.465344    36.0641    53.0641 |     T =       3
                 |                                            |
not_lf   overall |  998.1282   865.6179        263       4923 |     N =      78
         between |             876.3998        316   4886.333 |     n =      26
         within  |             34.17209   909.1282   1084.462 |     T =       3
                 |                                            |
public~v overall |  107802.8    80605.7      19625     564478 |     N =      78
         between |              68320.8   29792.33   292110.3 |     n =      26
         within  |             44167.72  -108736.6   380170.4 |     T =       3
                 |                                            |
schools  overall |  2341.462    741.667        959       4487 |     N =      78
         between |             744.2403        979       4168 |     n =      26
         within  |             102.7775   2013.462   2660.462 |     T =       3
                 |                                            |
teachers overall |  23107.81    14405.2       7625      83488 |     N =      78
         between |              14581.7       7676      80737 |     n =      26
         within  |             637.6908   20083.81   25858.81 |     T =       3
                 |                                            |
classr~s overall |  19888.82   9960.857       7096      62686 |     N =      78
         between |              10073.4   7401.333   60129.67 |     n =      26
         within  |             617.2301   17629.15   22445.15 |     T =       3
                 |                                            |
students overall |  556364.6   417857.4     132129    2499806 |     N =      78
         between |             422885.9   132741.7    2411456 |     n =      26
         within  |             20429.87   465965.9   644714.9 |     T =       3
                 |                                            |
underg~s overall |  82577.19   162410.1       5226     923147 |     N =      78
         between |             164017.8   5349.667   856022.7 |     n =      26
         within  |             13188.33  -4174.474   149701.5 |     T =       3
                 |                                            |
instru~s overall |  3284.744   4180.112         78      18788 |     N =      78
         between |             4231.589         84   18147.33 |     n =      26
         within  |             179.1303    2761.41    3925.41 |     T =       3
                 |                                            |
hospit~s overall |  6787.692   6249.379        990      35153 |     N =      78
         between |              6319.08   1194.667      33488 |     n =      26
         within  |             401.4124   4980.692   8452.692 |     T =       3
                 |                                            |
health~s overall |  11898.44      10002       2635      54895 |     N =      78
         between |             10096.41   2899.667   49475.67 |     n =      26
         within  |             866.1915   8695.769   17317.77 |     T =       350
Table 9: Correlations
Table 9.a: Correlations for Data Set 1
34
. corr  gva_tl  openness metro pm_2002  wap public_inv schools hospital_beds
(obs=78)
             |   gva_tl openness    metro  pm_2002      wap public~v  schools hospit~s
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------
      gva_tl |   1.0000
    openness |   0.7796   1.0000
       metro |   0.3253   0.5129   1.0000
     pm_2002 |   0.9305   0.7002   0.3227   1.0000
         wap |   0.9759   0.7503   0.3361   0.9775   1.0000
  public_inv |   0.2610   0.2425   0.0497   0.3596   0.3102   1.0000
     schools |   0.5286   0.3344   0.2303   0.7433   0.6351   0.4211   1.0000
hospital_b~s |   0.9514   0.7061   0.3463   0.9481   0.9729   0.2889   0.5874   1.0000
Table 9.b: Correlations for Data Set 2
35
. corr  gva_tl pm_rp_2002 emp teachers students undergraduate_students instructors health_workers
(obs=78)
             |   gva_tl pm_rp_~2      emp teachers students underg~s instru~s health~s
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------
      gva_tl |   1.0000
  pm_rp_2002 |   0.7727   1.0000
         emp |   0.9655   0.8209   1.0000
    teachers |   0.9301   0.8279   0.9556   1.0000
    students |   0.9350   0.8524   0.9329   0.9504   1.0000
undergradu~s |   0.3443   0.0528   0.3343   0.3011   0.2534   1.0000
instructors |   0.7841   0.5610   0.7484   0.8349   0.7235   0.3208   1.0000
health_wor~s |   0.9245   0.7228   0.9261   0.9657   0.8821   0.3187   0.9235   1.0000
Table 10: Some Estimation Results
36
Table 10.a: Result for Trade Openness (Economic Institution)
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        78
Group variable: panelvar                        Number of groups   =        26
R-sq:  within  = 0.0365                         Obs per group: min =         3
       between = 0.6229                                        avg =       3.0
       overall = 0.6078                                        max =         3
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =     37.31
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      gva_tl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    openness |   1.17e+08   1.92e+07     6.11   0.000     7.97e+07    1.55e+08
       _cons |    4761970    4739845     1.00   0.315     -4527956    1.41e+07
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |   18719878
     sigma_e |  5495371.4
         rho |  .92066081   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  
34 The variables in data set 1 are selected with the belief that they can provide signals for the presence of institutions 
in a given region.
35 The variables in data set 2 are selected with the belief that they can provide signals for the quality of institutions in 
a given region.
36 These estimations can be increased by introducing different variables into the regressions. This paper just shows 
some these  estimations to try to  maintain  a linkage between the  regional economic  disparities and some of the 
institutional structures. All the econometric work were done with using the 10th version of the STATA.51
Table 10.b: Result for the Number of Parliament Members (Politic Institution)
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        78
Group variable: panelvar                        Number of groups   =        26
R-sq:  within  =      .                         Obs per group: min =         3
       between = 0.8860                                        avg =       3.0
       overall = 0.8659                                        max =         3
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =    186.47
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      gva_tl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     pm_2002 |    2509251   183756.8    13.66   0.000      2149095     2869408
       _cons |  -3.09e+07    4399696    -7.03   0.000    -3.95e+07   -2.23e+07
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |  9937436.4
     sigma_e |  5544482.9
         rho |   .7626044   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 10.c: Results for the Number of Schools and Hospital Beds (Social Institutions)
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        78
Group variable: panelvar                        Number of groups   =        26
R-sq:  within  = 0.0707                         Obs per group: min =         3
       between = 0.8335                                        avg =       3.0
       overall = 0.8156                                        max =         3
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(2)       =    112.86
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      gva_tl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     schools |   12358.98   3500.237     3.53   0.000     5498.636    19219.31
hospital_b~s |   3221.782   462.9798     6.96   0.000     2314.358    4129.206
       _cons |  -2.86e+07    7630957    -3.74   0.000    -4.35e+07   -1.36e+07
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |  7469369.9
     sigma_e |  3119258.9
         rho |    .851502   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------52
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